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Abstract. Some methods for reasoning about concurrent programs and hardware devices have 
been based on proof systems for temporal logic. Unfortunately, all effective proof systems for 
temporal logic are incomplete for the standard semantics, in the sense that some formulas hold 
in every intended model but cannot be proved. We evaluate and compare the power of several 
proof systems for temporal logic. Specifically, we relate temporal systems to classical systems 
with explicit time parameters. 
A typical temporal system turns out to be incomplete in a strong sense; we exhibit a short, 
valid formula it fails to prove. We suggest the addition of new rules to define auxiliary predicates. 
With these rules, we obtain nonstandard soundness and completeness results. In particular, one 
of the simple temporal systems we describe is as powerful as Peano Arithmetic. 
Contents 
1. Introduction _. _. _. 
2. Temporal logic 
2.1. Syntax 
2.2. A possible-worlds semantics 
2.3. An arithmetical semantics 
3. On standard incompleteness 
3.1. The complexity of validity 
3.2. Weaker notions of completeness.. 
4. A basic proof system.. 
4.1. The proof system.. 
4.2. A very nonstandard completeness theorem. 
4.3. A nonstandard incompleteness theorem 
5. Auxiliary definitions 
5.1. Two systems with auxiliary definitions 
5.2. Two very nonstandard completeness theorems 
5.3. On resolution systems 
6. Clocks and arithmetical formulas 
6.1. Definitions and examples 
6.2. A basic theorem, 
36 
37 
31 
39 
41 
43 
43 
45 
46 
46 
47 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
58 
60 
* This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant DCR-84-13230 
and by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under Contract N00039-84-C-0211. 
** Present affiliation: Digital Equipment Corporation, Systems Research Center, 130 Lytton Avenue, 
Palo Alto, CA 94301, U.S.A. 
0304-3975/89/S3.50 0 1989, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland) 
36 M. Abadi 
7. Soundness and completeness. 
8. Related work 
9. Open questions 
Appendix 
A.l. Eliminating function symbols 
A.2. From predicates to sorts 
A.3. Some useful theorems 
Acknowledgment 
References 
....... 
....... 
....... 
....... 
....... 
....... 
....... 
...... 
...... 
...... 
...... 
....... 62 
....... 71 
....... 72 
....... 72 
....... 72 
....... 75 
....... 75 
....... 82 
....... 82 
1. Introduction 
Temporal logic has been used extensively to reason about concurrent systems. 
Some methods for verifying concurrent programs and hardware devices have been 
based on proof systems for first-order temporal logic, FTL (e.g., [19,22,2.5]). Thus, 
the quality and especially the power of these verification methods depend directly 
on the power of the underlying FTL proof systems (e.g., [17]). Unfortunately, all 
effective FTL proof systems are incomplete for the standard semantics, in the sense 
that some formulas hold in every intended model but cannot be proved. Evaluating 
temporal proof systems and the corresponding verification methods is therefore a 
nontrivial problem. 
In this paper, we first prove that all effective FTL proof systems are incomplete 
for the standard semantics and propose alternative notions of completeness. 
Specifically, we consider a translation of temporal formulas into classical formulas 
with explicit time parameters and ask questions such as “is the temporal formula 
u provable in (a given system for) temporal logic if and only if its translation is 
provable in (a given system for) classical logic ?” We study three FTL proof systems. 
The first one, T,,, is an extension of the usual Hilbert system of Manna and Pnueli 
[18] and equivalent to the resolution system of Abadi and Manna [3]. This basic 
system is incomplete in a strong sense. We exhibit a short valid formula that T,, 
fails to prove. The other ones, T, and T7, include T,, with new natural rules for 
defining auxiliary predicates. We give simple characterizations of T, and T,. For 
instance, our main positive result is that Tz is as powerful as Peano Arithmetic. This 
characterization can be read as a nonstandard soundness and completeness theorem, 
since it means that the formulas provable in Tz are exactly those that hold in every 
model of Peano Arithmetic. 
We concentrate on Hilbert systems because they are more usual and easier to 
understand than systems of other kinds. However, our methods are general, and, 
for instance, they immediately apply in the study of resolution systems [l]. 
Recently there has been much interesting related work on nonstandard logics of 
programs (e.g., [4,21,27, 28]), which proposes notions of completeness similar to 
ours. However, the existing results for temporal logic, which we discuss in more 
detail below, focus on provability of special classes of sentences, with restricted 
temporal formalisms, and in rather weak systems. In particular, they are of limited 
relevance to the verification of concurrent systems. 
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Section 2 reviews the syntax and semantics of FTL; the semantics of FTL is 
formulated in two equivalent ways: in terms of possible worlds and through a 
translation to classical logic. In Section 3 we show that the standard notion of 
validity is intractable and suggest some approximations based on provability in 
formal systems of arithmetic. In Section 4 we describe the basic system T, and prove 
a nonstandard completeness theorem and an incompleteness theorem. In Section 5 
we extend r, with rules to define auxiliary predicates and obtain the systems T, 
and Tz. We give nonstandard completeness theorems for T, and T2 ; these complete- 
ness theorems and the one in Section 4 are not very informative by themselves, but 
we invoke them in Section 6. We also discuss the connections between these systems 
and resolution systems with skolemization rules. In Section 6 we introduce the useful 
notions of “clock” and “arithmetical formula”. Section 7 contains the main sound- 
ness and completeness theorems for T, and T?. We compare our results with previous 
ones in Section 8 and pose some open problems in Section 9. Some of the more 
tedious and trivial proofs are relegated to an appendix. 
The material of this paper has appeared in a preliminary form in [2]. The full 
work is discussed in [l], where soundness and completeness issues for resolution 
systems are discussed in more detail. 
2. Temporal logic 
Several logics of time have been proposed (e.g., [6, 15,301). We consider one 
specific temporal logic described by Manna and Pnueli [17]. This logic is both 
general and relatively simple. In the intended models, time is discrete, linear, and 
extends infinitely toward the future. We refer to the propositional version of our 
logic as propositional temporal logic (PTL) and to the first-order version as first-order 
temporal logic (FTL). In this section we define PTL and FTL. 
2.1. Syntax 
2.1.1. Propositional temporal logic 
A language of PTL is a countable collection of propositional symbols p, q, r, 
s, . . . . Given a language, PTL formulas are built up using 
l propositional symbols in the language; 
l connectives: for simplicity, we assume that the only connectives are 1 (“not”), 
A (“and”), and v (“or”); we regard other connectives, such as true, false, = 
(“implies”) and - (“is equivalent to”), as abbreviations; 
l modal operators: the modal operators we consider are the usual ones for discrete 
linear time, 0 (“next”), 0 (“always”), 0 (“eventually”), and the more general 
“11 (“until”) and 9 (“precedes”). 
Thus, the formation rules for formulas are 
l all propositional symbols in the language under consideration are formulas; 
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l ifuandvareformulasthensoare~u,u~v,uvv,Ou,Ou,Ou,uOUv,andu~v. 
2.1.2. First-order temporal logic 
A language of FTL consists of a countable collection of predicate and function 
symbols p, q, r, s, . . , a, h, c, J; g, h, . . . We associate a nonnegative integer with 
each symbol in a language, as its arity. Propositional symbols and constant symbols 
are simply predicate symbols and function symbols with arity 0, respectively. Given 
a language, FTL formulas are built up using 
l predicate and function symbols in the language; 
l the equality symbol =, which we treat as an additional predicate symbol; 
l variable symbols, such as x, y, z, x0, y,, zo, x1, y,, z,, . . ; 
l connectives and modal operators, as in PTL; 
l the quantifiers V and 3. 
The formation rules for terms are 
l all variable symbols are terms; 
l if f’ is a function symbol of arity k and t, , . . , t,, are terms then j( t, , . . . , t,,) is 
a term. 
The formation rules for atomic formulas are 
l if p is a predicate symbol of arity k and I,, . . , t, are terms then p( t,, . . , tr) is 
an atomic formula; 
l if t, and t2 are terms then t, = t2 is an atomic formula. 
Other formulas are obtained as follows: 
l formulas are constructed from other formulas by application of connectives and 
modal operators, as in PTL; 
l if x is a variable and u is a formula then Vx. u and 3x. u are formulas. 
Thus, all PTL formulas are also FTL formulas. 
2.1.3. Flexible and rigid symbols 
In PTL, all propositional symbols are jlexible, that is, we intend to give them 
time-dependent meanings. 
In FTL, it is particularly convenient and natural to give time-independent mean- 
ings to some symbols, which we call rigid symbols, and time-dependent meanings 
to other symbols, which we call flexible symbols. Thus, in a given language of FTL, 
each symbol is either flexible or rigid. The equality symbol = is always rigid: two 
individuals are either always identical or always different (of course, if a and b are 
flexible symbols then a may equal b some times and may be different from b at 
other times; we attribute this to changes in the denotation of a and b rather than 
to changes in the denotation of =). 
A term or a formula is said to be rigid if it contains no occurrences of flexible 
symbols; otherwise, it is said to be flexible. 
For example, if bus-v is a flexible (time-dependent) unary predicate symbol and 
printer is a rigid (time-independent) constant symbol, then 
busy( printer) A OUlbusy( printer) 
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is a flexible formula. We intend to give the same value to printer in all states, and 
to make the property of being busy time-dependent. 
2.2. A possible-worlds semantics 
Informally, FTL formulas are evaluated over sequences of states. If u and v are 
formulas then 
l Ou means “U is true in the next state”; 
l q u means “u is always true (from now on)“; 
l Ou means “u is eventually true”; 
l u JQ v means “u is true until v is true”; in particular, u is true forever if v is 
never true (therefore, Q is often called “weak until” or “unless”); 
l u 9 v means “U precedes u”; that is, u must hold some time before the first time 
when v holds and must hold eventually if v never holds. 
A formal semantics is described in terms of possible worlds [ 131. Given a language, 
a model JG is a tuple (0, W, w”, R,, R?, LX, I). 
l The domain D is a nonempty set. 
l W, the frame is a set with a distinguished element wO. Intuitively, W is the set 
of worlds and w0 the present world. (We require that there be just one domain 
D common to all worlds, rather than a domain D,. for each element w of W, as 
in some other modal logics.) 
l R, and R, are two binary accessibility relations on W. Intuitively, R, corresponds 
to “next” and R, to “eventually”. 
l N is an assignment of values to the variables, that is, a mapping from the set of 
variables to D. 
l The interpretation I gives a meaning to predicate and function symbols: for each 
world w, I maps each predicate symbol p to a relation I( w, p) over D and each 
function symbol f to a function I(w,f) over D. The meaning of rigid symbols 
must be the same at all worlds. 
2.2.1. The evaluation function and the satisfaction relation 
If d,,..., d, are elements of D then 
./ti 0 (x, + d,, . . , x, + d,) 
denotes the model obtained from JU by modifying its assignment function (Y to map 
the variables x,, . . , x, to d,, . . , d,, respectively. If w is a world in W then .&@w 
denotes the model obtained from ,U by modifying its present world to be w. 
We inductively define the binary evaluation function T, which evaluates terms in 
models, the binary satisfaction relation between models and formulas, +: 
l For terms: 
T( .A, x) = a(x), 
dJ%f(t,, . ‘. , h)) = ~(%,f)(~(JtZ, t ), ‘. , dJ& tk)). 
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l For atomic formulas: 
.dd+P(t,, . . ‘, fk) - I(W”,P)(d.,K t,), . . . , 44 k)), 
Al= t, = t, c3 T(.U, t,) = T(,A, tz). 
l For connectives: 
MI=lU e .&z#u, 
.dk u A u a [..tib u A ./u+ v], 
.tiku v u e [JMbu v ./tikV]. 
l For quantifiers: 
Thus, 0 u is equivalent to u %fulse. Furthermore, 0 u and u B v are equivalent to 
10 -iu and l((lu) % u), respectively. 
2.2.2. Standard models, satisfiahility, and validity 
The model A is standard if ( W, wo, R,, R2) is isomorphic to (N, 0, S, s), that is, 
the natural numbers with the constant zero, the successor function, and the less-than 
relation. In particular, R, is a function and R, is the reflexive transitive closure of 
R, in all standard models. 
We are interested in standard models because they are the intended models of 
temporal logic. On the other hand, we need to consider other models as well, in 
particular when we study soundness and completeness issues. 
The formula u is saksfiuble if some standard model .A/ satisfies U, that is, Al k U. 
The formula u is ualid if all standard models satisfy u; we denote this by ku. 
Free variables are implicitly universally quantified as far as validity is concerned: 
u is valid exactly when Vx. u is valid. 
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2.3. An arithmetical semantics 
So far we have described models and the satisfaction relation in terms of possible 
worlds. An alternative way to interpret FTL is to translate temporal formulas into 
classical formulas that contain some arithmetic symbols. This arithmetical semantics 
is equivalent to the possible-world semantics. However, it leads to some insights 
about the complexity of FTL and about alternatives to the standard notion of 
completeness, typical of Correspondence Theory, which studies connections between 
modal and classical systems [31]. 
For each temporal language L, we define a countable, two-sorted, classical 
language Lo (“0” stands for “order”). 
The sort SN, which we interpret as the sort of natural numbers, is equipped with 
the constant symbol 0, the function symbol s, the predicate symbol G, and the 
equality symbol =. It is technically practical to consider that in actuality 0 and s 
are just convenient, informal abbreviations for the unary predicate symbol 0, and 
the binary predicate symbol s,,, respectively. A countable supply of variables of the 
number sort are denoted by letters like i; terms of this sort are denoted by letters 
like m. 
The equality symbol = and all predicate and function symbols in L are also in 
Lo, to operate on the sort S,,, which we interpret as the sort of data. The arity of 
rigid symbols in Lo is the same as in L. Terms of sort SN cannot occur as arguments 
of these rigid symbols. The arity of flexible symbols in Lo is their arity in L 
incremented by one. Terms of sort S ,,, occur as last arguments of these flexible 
symbols, and in no other argument position. 
For example, a typical formula of Lo is 
3xVi. [s(j) G i 1 p(f(x, a, s(i)), i)]. 
Here, i andj are intended to range over numbers; s and s have their usual intended 
meanings. On the other hand, x ranges over some arbitrary data domain; a is 
uninterpreted in this same domain; f is uninterpreted, with this domain as range, 
and two pieces of data and one number as arguments; p is uninterpreted, with two 
arguments, one piece of data and one number. 
A two-sorted classical model for L, consists of the following components: two 
sets DN and D,, the universes for the sorts S, and S,, respectively; relations on 
DN to interpret O,, s,,, and s; relations of the appropriate types to interpret the 
other predicate and function symbols; and two functions to assign values to variables, 
one for SD and one for SN. 
As usual, the satisfaction relation, kO, is defined inductively over formulas. By 
.& b. w we mean that the two-sorted classical model “ti satisfies the Lo formula w, 
with no assumptions on the properties of JR (in particular, DN need not even be 
countable). We can give a standard semantics to L, in the natural way, requiring 
that D, be the natural numbers, s the usual less-than relation between numbers, 
etc. The interpretation of the data symbols is left open. By b0 w we mean that all 
standard models satisfy w. Thus, + o represents standard validity. 
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Any temporal formula in a language L can be translated into a classical formula 
in the corresponding language Lo ; informally, we may think of this classical formula 
as the meaning of the temporal formula. The function P maps FTL formulas to 
their translations in arithmetic. 
Definition. For all U, let P(u) = P*(u, 0), where P* is an auxiliary translation 
function defined by 
P(P*(t,, m), ‘. . , p*(k, ml) 
P*(P(‘,,...,‘kLm)= 
1 
if p is a rigid symbol, 
p(P”(r,, m), . . .) P*(tk, m), m) 
if p is a flexible symbol, 
P*(o u, m) = P*(u, s(m)), 
P*(U u, m) = Vi 3 m. P*(u, i) (i and j are new variables), 
P*(O u, m) = Eli3 m. P*(u, i), 
P*(~~llqm)=Vi~m.(P*(u, i)vYj.(mSjSir, P*(u,j))), 
P*(uY~,m)=3i~m.(P”(u,i)~Vj.(m~j~i~iP*(v,j))) 
and P* preserves connectives, quantifiers, and variables. 
Furthermore, there is a natural function % to convert a possible-world model J4 
into a two-sorted classical model. The data domain in ‘?Z(,ti) is 0, the domain of 
.I/; the number domain in %(.a) is W, the set of possible worlds in JR; 0, s, and s 
correspond to M’~~, R,, and R,, respectively. The assignment and the interpretation 
are not affected. 
The following simple propositions express that the possible-world semantics and 
the arithmetical semantics are fundamentally the same. 
2.1. Proposition. A I= u C3 %(A) b. P( u). 
Proof. A simple inductive argument on the structure of u yields the result. n 
The function % is a bijection. Let 9 be its inverse. 
2.2. Proposition. 9(&/u) k u e “Zl b. P(u). 
Proof. Given a classical model .M, Proposition 2.1 guarantees that 
S(A) I= u e %(S(.iu)) i=<> P(u). 
The result follows immediately, because %(9(.IH)) = ,H. W 
Note that Ce maps standard possible-world models into standard classical models. 
Also, 9 maps standard classical models into standard possible-world models. Thus, 
the propositions yield the following corollary. 
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2.3. Corollary. k u ti b0 P(u). 
Proof. Suppose that lu holds in the standard possible-world model .H. Then P(lu) 
holds in the standard classical model %‘(.&). Since lP(u) = P(lu), IP(u) holds 
in the standard classical mode1 %(A). To check the other direction of the 
equivalence, suppose that lP(u) holds in the standard classical mode1 -44, that is, 
P(lu) holds in 4. Therefore, 1~ holds in the standard possible-world model 
9(&). H 
Thus, in a precise sense, if we redefine the meaning of a FTL formula u to be 
the meaning of P(U), the semantics remains the same. 
3. On standard incompleteness 
We prove that standard validity is II:-complete (see, for example, [26]). In 
particular, no effective system for FTL can be complete in the standard sense. 
Therefore, we propose more realistic and practical notions of completeness. 
3.1. The complexity of validity 
A formula u is II: if u = (VR,. . . VRkVF, . . VF,.. v) for some classical first-order 
formula v, and 0, s, 4, +, X, R,, . . . , Rk, F,, . . . , Fk, are all the predicate and 
function symbols in v. The complexity class II: includes all problems no harder 
than the truth problem for 11: formulas. 
The following proposition and its corollary state that the validity problem is in 
the class II). Intuitively, the question of the validity of a temporal formula can be 
reduced to the question of the truth of a II t formula-we replace times with numbers. 
3.1. Proposition. b0 is in II:. 
Proof. If a formula has a standard model then we can construct a standard term 
model. As usual, the domain of this model is a set of terms modulo equality in the 
original model. Since the languages under consideration are countable, this term 
model is also countable. 
In turn, if a formula has a countable model then we can construct a model with 
N as data domain. To do this, we number the elements of the original mode1 and 
say that a relation holds for a tuple of numbers in the new model if it holds for the 
corresponding data in the original model. 
Thus, b0 u if u holds in all standard models with N as domain. Therefore, all 
uninterpreted symbols in u can be taken to range over relations and functions on 
numbers. We conclude that b0 u if and only if VR, . . . VRkVF, . . . VF,,.u holds 
for the natural numbers, where 0, s, G, R,, . . . , Rk, F,, . . . , Fkc are all the predicate 
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and function symbols in U. This reduces the question of the validity of u to the 
question of the truth of a 11: formula. n 
Since the translation function P is primitive recursive, we have the following 
corollary. 
3.2. Corollary. + is in 11:. 
The symbol i= refers to validity over the standard models, which have frames 
isomorphic to the natural numbers. We exploit this to show that the upper bound 
of the previous corollary is actually tight, that is, k is Iii-complete. 
3.3. Theorem. k is KIl-hard. 
Proof. It suffices to show a recursive translation function to embed 11; formulas in 
FTL. More precisely, we want a function E to map 11 i formulas to temporal formulas 
such that u is true if and only if k E(u). 
Given u of the form VR, . . . VRkVF, . VF,,. u, with u a first-order formula, we 
may drop the second-order quantifiers, since the notion of validity contains an 
implicit universal quantification on free predicate and function symbols. More 
precisely, let E(u) = E’(v), where E’ is an auxiliary function. To define E’, we first 
“simulate” numbers in FTL. Let 0, s, s, +, and x be rigid uninterpreted symbols 
of the appropriate arities and a be a flexible constant symbol. Let A be the sentence 
(Vx.0 a=x)/\(Vx.cl(a=x~00 a#x)) 
r,(a=O) 
A(VXVy.(X~y=O(LZ=XAO a=y))) 
A(tlX.X+O=X) 
A(vxvy.x+s(y)=s(x+y)) 
A(vX.XXo=o) 
A(tlXVy.XxS(y)=Xxy+X). 
The sentence A defines the numbers and the corresponding operations, by represent- 
ing the number i as the value of a at time i. Furthermore, A guarantees that all 
elements of the domain represent numbers. More precisely, suppose that .A is a 
model for a language that includes the symbols 0, s, s, +, X, R,, . . . , Rk, and 
F, , . . , FL.. Let D be the domain of A4 and let 0 ,,, s ,,,, G,(,, + !,, x 11 be the 
interpretations for 0, s, c, f, X, respectively. If A holds in .A then the structure 
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(0, o,,, s,t<, s.tt, +.a, x,(0 is isomorphic to the natural numbers with the usual arith- 
metic operations. Now let E’(v) = (A 1 v). The embedding E has the desired 
properties. n 
Remark. The proof does not use any flexible symbols other than one flexible constant 
symbol. Therefore, the theorem holds even for restricted FTL languages where all 
predicate symbols and (nonconstant) function symbols are rigid. 
Also, the proof does not require quantification in modal contexts: A does not 
contain quantifiers in modal contexts, and o does not contain modal operators. As 
usual, all quantifiers can be extracted (using skolemization); thus, the proof indicates 
that the validity problem for FTL sentences of the form 3x. U, where u is quantifier- 
free and x denotes a list of variables, remains II:-complete. On the other hand, the 
validity problem for quantifier-free formulas is clearly decidable, since it is essentially 
a propositional temporal problem. 
Remark. The theorem was first proved by Parikh [24]. We have proved it again 
independently. A third proof could exploit the theory of dominoes, as Harel’s 
intractability proof for first-order dynamic logic [12]. 
3.2. Weaker notions of completeness 
Thus, the standard concept of validity is overly demanding from a theorem-proving 
perspective: no practical system could possibly be complete with respect to b. Like 
arithmetic [lo], temporal logic has no recursively enumerable axiomatization, that 
is, it does not have any useful axiomatization at all. Weaker, recursively enumerable 
alternatives to the standard concept of validity may be more appropriate and useful 
in the study of FTL proof systems. 
For instance, consider equipping a two-sorted classical language Lo with a proof 
system. Take k. to mean provability in first-order logic. Of course, we include the 
usual equality axioms (reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, substitutivity), and func- 
tionality axioms to the effect that there is a unique 0 and that successors are unique; 
we also give natural axioms for 0, S, and d [20]: 
F,Vi.(s(i)#O), 
F0ViVj.(s(j)3i=j), 
F,Vi.((iSO)=(i=O)), 
FOViV,j.(iSs(j)-(i=s(j)viSj)), 
t-o u[O] A (Vi. u[i] 1 u[s(i)]) 2 (Vi. u[i]). 
Given a proof concept I- for FTL and a formula U, we may ask whether 
E u if and only if k. P(U). 
The proof concept k. takes into account a large class of nonstandard models, that 
is, provability with t, is equivalent to validity over a class of models much larger 
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than the class of standard models. The equivalence “tu if and only if to P(u)” is 
the least restrictive requirement we find acceptable: any FTL system incomplete 
with respect to ~~ should probably be replaced with a system that translates temporal 
formulas into classical formulas and then uses ko. 
Now suppose that the function symbols + and x are added to &-again, it is 
practical to regard them as abbreviations for the ternary predicate symbols -t,, and 
X p, respectively. The new language is Lp (“P” stands for “Peano”). The usual 
Peano axioms for + and x are added to +,: 
k-p Vi.(i+O= i), 
k-,ViVj.(i+s(j)=s(i+j)), 
kP Vi.( i X 0 = 0), 
FP ViVj. (i x s(j) = i Xj+ 1). 
Also, the induction schema is extended to the language with + and X. We obtain 
t,. Note that k,, is strictly more powerful than t, [4]. Given a proof concept + 
for FTL and a formula u, we may ask whether 
E u if and only if +p P( u). 
Since Peano Arithmetic proves almost all valid sentences of practical interest, 
completeness with respect to + p is an attractive requirement. 
4. A basic proof system 
We start the study of FTL proof systems with a description of a basic Hilbert 
system r,, an extension of the Hilbert system of Manna and Pnueli [18] to our 
languages, equivalent to the resolution system of Abadi and Manna [3]. We prove 
a very nonstandard completeness theorem and a nonstandard incompleteness 
theorem for To. 
4.1. The proof s>lsrern 
Many Hilbert systems have been given for linear-time propositional temporal 
logics. Gabbay, Pnueli, Shelah, and Stavi proposed the following one [9]: 
l If kH u and t,(u 1 u) then t, u. 
l If ~~ u then Ed 0 U. 
l If u is a tautology then +H u. 
l ›H~(P~q)~(OP30 9). 
. FH 0(1p)=1Op. 
l F-H o(P~q)~(oP~oq). 
. t,clp~pAOclp. 
l +HO(P~OP)~(P~nPL 
l +F/ •P~(P~qh 
l ä H(P”llq)-s”(PAo(P”lIq)). 
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This system is complete for PTL with the operators 0, 0, and %. When the two 
axioms involving % are deleted, the system is complete for PTL with the operators 
0 and q . Finally, the axioms kH Op = 10 lp and tt,(~CPq) = l((-~p) %q) 
handle 0 and 9’. 
Manna and Pnueli have presented a similar Hilbert system for PTL and have 
extended it to a variant of FTL where only constant symbols may be flexible. This 
extension is based on the addition of traditional quantifier rules and a variant of 
the Barcan axiom, (Vx.0 u) 1 (ClVx. u). 
We describe a basic Hilbert system T, for FTL that also relies on traditional 
quantifier rules and variants of the Barcan axiom: 
l If kr,, u and Ed, (U = u) then k-7;] U. 
l If t-T! u then t-T, 0 u. 
l If t-T, (u 1 v) and x is not free in u then kT,, (u ~VX. 0). 
l If u is an instance of a schema valid in PTL then +&, U. 
l If u is a rigid formula then tT1 u = 0 u. 
l If u is an equality axiom then tT, u. 
. +,,3x. 1u=1vx.u. 
l tT, (Vx. w) 2 w0 where 0 is the substitution {xc r} and does not create any new 
bound occurrences of variables or any new occurrences of flexible terms in the 
scope of modal operators. 
. ET, (Vx.0 u) = (0 Vx. U). 
l If x is not free in u then tT1 [Vx. (u %1 u)] = [(Vx. u) 4Y v]. 
The first axiom schema, “if u is an instance of a schema valid in PTL then kT, u,” 
conveniently abstracts away all details of how PTL proofs are constructed. Of course, 
the schema could be replaced with any complete system for PTL, such as the one 
described above. In particular, we would have an induction schema, q ( u 10 u) 1 
(u 10 u). 
The last two axiom schemas resemble the Barcan axiom. They attempt to capture 
the fact that the domain of discourse is time-independent. 
4.2. A very nonstandard completeness theorem 
In this section we present a nonstandard strong-completeness theorem for T,. 
We say that the theorem is very nonstandard because it states the equivalence 
between provability in TO and validity over a large class of models. The theorem 
answers an immediate, natural question about TO and is useful in later sections. 
A set of formulas E is TO-consistent if t+,, l(u, A . . . A u,) for all u,, . . . , u, E 2. 
A model of T,, is a model where all the theorems of T, hold at every world. The 
system T, is trivially sound with respect to models of T,; the following theorem 
says that TO is also complete with respect to models of TO. The proof of the theorem 
is based on a new variation on well-known techniques for constructing a model 
from a consistent set of formulas. 
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4.1. Theorem (Very nonstandard strong completeness). If the set of formulas 2 is 
T,,-consistent then .X holds in some model of T,,. 
Proof. The proof of strong completeness requires only usual techniques (e.g., [8, 
pp. 273-2761) when the logic does not include O21 and 9. When the logic does include 
011 and 9, these techniques fail. Moreover, typical known results for PTL (e.g., [9]) 
do not extend to FTL because the models constructed in their proofs satisfy formulas 
with % and Y only after some steps impossible in first-order logics. Burgess [5] has 
proven other completeness theorems for logics with the operators “since” and 
“until.” However, his results do not immediately apply to a logic without past 
operators, because in his system reasoning about the future may include intermediate 
deductions about the past, and it is not obvious that these can be avoided. 
We give a new construction of models of modal logics, to obtain a model Jti for 
a consistent set of formulas C. We emphasize the difficulties found in the proposi- 
tional case. Our technique has the feature of extending to the first-order logic without 
any new insights. 
We prove the theorem for languages with no flexible function symbols. This 
limited version is all we use later on (in Section 6) and entails no loss of generality 
(as is checked in the Appendix). 
Throughout the proof, we claim that certain formulas are theorems of TO when 
they are instances of simple valid PTL schemas. Similarly, we use some derived 
inference rules, such as “if kT;> u then Ed, 0 u,” that follow from the rule “if t,;) u 
then tT, II U“ by propositional temporal reasoning. 
In the propositional case, given a T,,-consistent set of formulas 2 we define a 
model J& as follows: 
W = {(Eo, UJ 1 X’,, is a maximally consistent set of formulas 
and ug is a formula}, 
wg = (Z*, ,fu/se) where X* is any maximally consistent extension of 
~‘u{uI+,$4 
R, = {(( Co, u,), (E,, u,)) 1 for all u, 0 u E I‘,, * u E I,}, 
&={((&, 4, (Z, u,))lu,@&, u,@Z and 
for all U, u % U, E & 3 u E E,}, 
p holds at (&, u,)) if and only if p E I,,. 
Then we remove all worlds not reachable from wo, to obtain the model Jll. 
Intuitively, the definitions identify the world w = (I,, ug) with the set of formulas 
Z, that hold at w. The second component of a world, a formula u(), is a new technical 
device whose intuitive meaning is explained below. Lindenbaum’s Lemma guaran- 
tees that if C is T,-consistent then 2 u {u ( kr;, u} has a maximally consistent 
extension. Therefore, we may choose the initial world w0 to satisfy 1 and all the 
theorems of T,,. As usual, we define accessibility in such a way that one world is 
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accessible from another world if this relation is acceptable in view of the formulas 
that the worlds contain. Thus, w R, w’ whenever if 0 u is in w then u is in w’. In 
usual completeness proofs, R, is defined similarly: w R, w’ whenever if i? u is in w 
then u is in w’. The second argument of w’, the formula u’, makes possible an 
important refinement: only the formulas that need to hold until U’ must be in w’. 
In other words, we intend to read w R, w’ as “w’ comes after w, but before u’ holds.” 
All elements of C appear in the initial world. Also, all theorems of T, appear in 
all worlds, since if t7;] u then i-T> 0 u and tT, u Ou u,. 
Note that if we had a rigid proposition symbol p then p would receive the 
same value in all worlds, since tK, p = 0 p, and hence (by propositional temporal 
reasoning) 
tr,, [P 2 0 PI A [TJ 10 ~1 and 
ET;] [P = (P Q %)I A [lP = (CT) a u,)l. 
Now we prove that all elements of E hold in the initial world and all theorems 
of T, hold in all worlds, via a more general lemma. 
4.2. Lemma (Truth lemma). For every world (&, u,), membership in & and truth 
in (X0, uO) are equivalent, that is, 
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the depth of modal operators in u. The 
base case, where u is classical, is straightforward. For the inductive step, the proof 
proceeds by induction on the structure of u. We establish the result for the base 
case, that is, for formulas where the main connective is a modal operator. The cases 
for Ou and 9 subsume those for 0 and 0, since t,;, (0 u) = (u Qfalse) and 
i-q) (0 u) = (u Pfulse). We omit the routine arguments for the classical connectives, 
which constitute the inductive step. 
Case 1: Suppose that 0 v E E,. We want to show that 0 v holds at IO, that is, 
ZIE 1, for some (I,, u,) such that (&,, u,,)R,(Z,, u,). Note that if tT!lu then 
FT, 70 u; moreover, 
t,,(Our\On’) = O(UAU’) and tT,lOu = 01~. 
Hence, since & is consistent, 1: = {u 10 u E I,} is consistent as well: suppose that 
I-F, l( u’ A . . . A u”) forsome u’,...,ukEZ(:; 
then 
l~,lO(u'A-AUk), 
and hence 
+T;, l((0 U')A. . .A(0 Uk)), 
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with (0 u’), . . . , (0 u”) E &. Let 1, be a maximally consistent extension of 2,’ 
(there is one, by Lindenbaum’s Lemma) and u, an arbitrary formula. Clearly, u E 1, 
and (&, uJR,(%, u,). 
Case 2: Suppose that u P V’E &. We want to show that u P U’ holds at (I,, u,), 
that is, for some (I,, u,) such that (&, ug) R2 (I,, u,), L;E 1, and, for all (_I&, u2) 
between (I,,, uO) and (Z,, u,) in the R2 relation, tl’gIZz. Note that if F.,-ILL then 
tT, 0 lu and hence F &, l(u 9 0’); also 
t~,(u~iP’)A(u’“%1v’) 3 ((UAU’)PP’). 
Hence, since .&, is consistent, JZd = {u} u {u 1 u % U’E &,} is consistent as well: 
suppose that 
I-x, l(V A u’ A. . . A u”) forsome u’,...,u’EIi; 
then 
and hence 
t,,1((U~P’)A(U’~~21’)A...A(Uk~~21’)), 
with (U P u’), ( u1 “u u’), . . , (u” oil u’) E I,,. Let 1, be a maximally consistent 
extension of I(: (there is one, by Lindenbaum’s Lemma) and u, = u’. Clearly, v E 2,. 
Also, C-T,, 4 Rz (E,, ~3: 
(1) v’e&, since v.Pv’~& and t,,vY~‘~~u’. 
(2) u’& Z,, since tT, (-iv’) “U u’, and hence (1~‘) 3 IJ’E 1, and ~U’E _I‘, . 
(3) If u % U’ E X‘,, then u E I,, by the construction of I,. 
Now suppose that for some (X, uJ we have (&, q,) R, (I,, u2) R, (ii%-,, v'). By the 
definition of R,, V'FG CL, as desired. 
Case 3: Suppose that v 021 V’E IO. We want to show that v “11 v’ holds at (&, uO), 
that is, for all (2, , u,) such that (&, u,,) R, (E, , u,), u t 2, or, for some (I?, u2) 
between (Z,,, LQ,) and (.X,, u,) in the R, relation, u’~ .X2. Consider an arbitrary 
(2,) u,) such that (X0, ug) R, (2," u,). Either ZI 9~ u, E &, or v’ P u, E C, because 
t,, tl% zl’ 2 [(VOU u,) v (V’Y u,)]. 
In the former case, u E 2, by the definition of R2. In the latter case, we assume that 
~$1, and construct a world between (&, u,,) and (2,) u,) where V’ appears. If 
U’E 1, then we take (&, u2) = (I,, u,). Clearly, U’E I,. The accessibility conditions 
are fulfilled: since + r,, u % u, =) (u v u,) and u, e! I,, if u % u, E & then u E 2,. Now 
suppose that V’F? I,. Since u FZ 1, we get (iv) 9 u, E I‘,,. Then u’ P (1~ A 1~‘) E &, 
follows, since tT, ((iv) 9 u,) A (u % 0’) 1 (u’ .“p (TV A TV’)). Note that if tT, lu then 
FT, i( u 9 21’); also, 
k,,(U~P’)A(U’%d) 1 ((UAU’) PP’). 
Hence, since &, is consistent, 
~,t={v’}u{u’(u’% (lUAlU’)E&,} 
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is consistent as well (the argument is similar to the one in the previous case). Let 
Zz be a maximally consistent extension of Z,’ (there is one, by Lindenbaum’s 
Lemma) and u2 = (1~ A 1~‘). Clearly, U’E &. To show that (_I$, lz, A 1~‘) is between 
(&,, uO) and (El, u,), we check: 
(1) (lur\lv’)~& follows from ~0% U’E& and F~, uOU u’~(vv 0’). 
(2) (iv A iv’) sf & follows from u’E C,. 
(3) If u Ou (1~ A iv’) E & then u E &, by the construction of &. 
(4) u, g &: Since (1~ A iv’) E 2,) (TV A 10’) p u, E 2,. Then note that FTil (1~ A 
iv’) 9 U, 2 (iu,) “21 (TV A iv’). Thus, (lu,) %! (iv A TV’) E & and hence in, E XI;, 
(since (C,, u(,) RI (X,, u,), as (l), (2), and (3) guarantee). 
(5) U, & 1, follows from the hypothesis that (&, u,,) R2 (E,, u,). 
(6) If u Ou u, E X2 then u E 2, : Equivalently, we show that if u E _ZY’, then u 9 u, E Zr : 
Suppose that u E 2,. Then iu A ~U’A u E 2,. Therefore, (1~ A ~U’A u) 9 u, E &. 
Note that 
ET;, ((1U A 1U’A U) 9 U,) 2 [((lU A 1U’A U) 9 24,) %! (1U A ld)], 
+T, [((l?J A 1U’A U) 8 U,) % (1U A IV’)] 3 ((U 9 U,) ‘%1 (1U A 1U’)). 
Thus, (u .PP u,) % (lu A TV’) E &, and u P u, E Cl (since (&, u,,) R2 (2,) u,), as (l), 
(2), and (3) guarantee). 
In all three cases, duality considerations ease the proof of the other direction of 
the equivalence. 
Case 1: Suppose that 0 u holds at IO. We want to show that 0 u E I,, If 0 u 
holds at Z,, then some (2,) u,) such that (&, u”) R, (_?I,, u,) contains u. Since 
lu & I,, the definition of R, yields 0 lu & &. Since F~, 10 u = 0 lu, we obtain 
0 u E 10. 
Case 2: Suppose that u P u’ holds at &. We want to show that u 9 u’ E 2,. We 
suppose that u 9 u’& 1, to show that u 9 u’ does not hold at .X0, and thus obtain a 
contradiction. Since u 9’ u’@ 2, and t%, l(u P u’) = ((iv) % u’), we have that 
(iv) Ou u’ E 2,. Since the depth of modal operators in l( v 9 u’) and (1~) % ZI’ is 
the same, this implies that (iv) Q u’ holds at &. Hence, u P u’ does not hold at X0. 
Case 3: Suppose that u % u’ holds at I‘,. We want to show that u % u’ e &. We 
suppose that v 021 u’@ I0 to show that u %1 u’ does not hold at X0, and thus obtain a 
contradiction. Since u Ou u’.@ Z0 and kT;, l(u %! u’) = ((10) .oP u’), we have that 
(iv) 9 u’ E IO. Since the depth of modal operators in 1( u 021 u’) and (1~) .P u’ is 
the same, this implies that (iv) 9 u’ holds at X,,. Hence, u % u’ does not hold 
at X0. n 
This concludes the propositional model construction. The first-order model con- 
struction is based on the propositional one. As is typical for first-order completeness 
proofs, the sets of formulas that appear in the construction of worlds are not only 
maximally consistent but also saturated. (Recall that &, tr,, u if for some u, , . . . , u,, E 
&,+T,,(%“. . . A u,) 2 u; &is omega-complete if I,, Fr,, u[ t] for every term t implies 
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& tTl t/x. u[x], where x is a new variable; I0 is saturated if it is both omega-complete 
and maximally consistent.) 
Fortunately, the extension to FTL requires only two new propositions-all other 
details are very similar to those given in [8, pp. 273-2761; in particular, the extension 
is considerably simplified by the presence of the Barcan formula. We show that if 
.& is a saturated set then {U ) 0 u E &,} and {U 1 u (42 U’E &} are omega-complete (this 
is analogous to the key step in Lemma 3 on p. 275 of [S]). 
4.3. Proposition. If & is a saturated set then {u ) 0 u E &o) is omega-complete. 
Proof. Suppose that {v/O u E &}t-r,, u[t] for every term t. If tq, v 1 u[t] then 
I--T;, (0 u)=(O u[tl); also, 
ET, (0 U”) A (0 u,) = O(U”A u,). 
Hence, & E 0 u[t] for every t, and Z:,, kTil Vx. (0 u[x]) since &, is omega-complete. 
Furthermore, kT7;, Vx. (0 u[x]) 1 O(Vx. u[x]). Since .X0 is maximally consistent, 
O(Vx. u[x]) E &. Thus, (Vx. u[x]) E {v 10 u E &} and, immediately, 
IulO u E Z”> +r;, (~x.u[xl), 
as desired. n 
4.4. Proposition. ff &, is a saturated set then {u ( u Uu v’ E X0} is omega-complete for 
every v’. 
Proof. Suppose that 
{v~v~z~‘E2”}~7,,U[t] 
for every term t. If Ed) v = u[ t] then k7;, (v 021 u’) 1 (u[ t] 021 v’); also, 
t--r;, (U,j % v’) A (24, % v’) = (( ug A u,) 021 V’). 
Hence, & + (u[ r]) “11 u’ for every t, and .X0 I~, Vx.[( u[x]) Ou v’] since 2, is omega- 
complete. Furthermore, kr;, Vx.[(u[x]) % v’] = [(Vx. u[x]) % v’), because the new 
variable x does not occur in v’. Since Z,, is maximally consistent, (Vx. u[x]) 011 U’E I,,. 
Thus, (VX. u[x]) E {v 1 v Ou U’E I’,,} and, immediately, 
(0 I *“II U’E -w i-T> wx. 4x7), 
as desired. n n 
Remark. The proof of Theorem 4.1 does not require all schemas valid in PTL. For 
instance, we do not exploit the connections between 0 and %. Thus, the same 
completeness proof applies to some other modal logics with different axioms about 
time. 
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4.3. A nonstandard incompleteness theorem 
The completeness theorem of the previous section may appear as a first promising 
step in proving that T,, is reasonably powerful. Furthermore, systems equivalent to 
T, are often empirically satisfactory. As we prove here, however, tq, is surprisingly 
weak-not even complete with respect to t,: 
4.5. Theorem (Nonstandard incompleteness). There is a formula uO such that 
+oP(u,) but v,, ~0. 
Proof. Fix the language to contain only the flexible constant symbol a and the 
flexible predicate symbol p. Let u0 be 
Intuitively, u,, says that if a enumerates the domain in a sequence of instants, p 
holds for the first element in the enumeration, and if it holds for an element then 
it holds for its successor in the enumeration, then it must hold for all elements in 
the domain. In a sense, u0 establishes a connection between induction on time and 
induction in a domain. 
Significantly, bL,, uO. To show this, it suffices to construct a model ,& of T,, where 
u0 fails. Let the domain and the set of worlds in the model, D and W, both equal 
N +Z, that is, a copy of (0, 1, . . .} and a copy of {. . . , -l’, 0’, l’, . . .}. The initial 
world w0 is 0, R, is the union of the successor functions on N and 2, RI is s with 
m G n’ for all m and n (in other words, we put N before 2). In the initial world, 
p(x) holds if and only if x is in N; in ail other worlds, p(x) is always false. In 
world i, a has value i. 
The formula 
holds in Ju. However, (Vx.p(x)) does not hold. Therefore, u0 is falsified in this 
model. We still need to check that JR is a model of T,,. We show that all instances 
of schemas valid in PTL hold at every world; all the other axioms and rules of T,, 
are sound for constant-domain possible-world models. In fact, we only consider 
the schemata (0 lu) - ~(0 u), Cl u 3 (u A 0 0 u), u 011 u = [v v u A 0( u Ou v)], and 
q (u 2 0 U) =) (u 2 0 u)-since these schemata, added to others which hold for all 
possible-world models, yield the complete PTL axiom system of Gabbay, Pnueli, 
Shelah, and Stavi [9]. 
(1) The schema (0 lu) - ~(0 u) holds at all worlds in JR since R, is a function. 
(2) The schema q u~(ur\OO u) follows from uoUu~[vvu~O(u%v)] 
(proved below), since Cl u = (u OUfuZse) holds in all possible-world models. 
(3) The schema u % ZI 2 [U v u A O(u % v)] holds at all worlds in 4: Assume that 
u CU ZI holds at some arbitrary world w,. Since R2 is reflexive, either ZI or u must 
hold at w, (by the semantics of Ou for possible-world models). If u holds then 
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u v u A O(u 92 V) holds. Otherwise, consider the world w2 such that w, R, w2. It 
suffices to show that u 011 v holds at w2, that is, that u holds until u holds in the 
“future” of w2. Since R, c R2 and R2 is transitive, any wj such that w2 R2 w3 also 
satisfies wi R2 wj. By our hypothesis, either u holds at w3 or v holds at some world 
wq such that w, R, w4 and wq R2 wi. Since v does not hold at w, and RZ- (R, 0 R,) = 
{(w, w) ) w E W}, w4 must satisfy w2 R, wq and wq R, wj. In short, for any wj such 
that w2 R, w3, either u holds or v holds at some wq such that w2 R, w4 and wq R, w3, 
that is, u Ou v holds at w2. 
(4) The schema [v v u A 0( u Ou v)] 1 u 021 v holds at all worlds in JH: Assume that 
v v u A 0( u 011 v) holds at some arbitrary world w, . If v holds at w,, u % u holds as 
well, by the reflexivity of R, and the semantics of Q. Otherwise, assume u holds at 
w, and u 021 u holds at its successor world, w2. Therefore, for all w3 such that w: R2 w3 
either u holds or for some w4 such that w2 R2 w4 and w4 R, w3, v holds. Since u 
holds at w, and R, - (R, 0 R,) = {(w, w) 1 w E W}, we can derive that for all wj such 
that w, R2 wj either u holds or, for some wq such that w2 R2 w4 and wq R2 w3, v 
holds. Since R, c R, and R, is transitive, any such wq must also satisfy w, R, w4, 
so for all wj such that w, R2 wi either u holds or for some wq such that w, R2 w4 
and wq R, wj, v holds, that is, u % v holds at us,. 
(5) The induction schema, 0 (u 10 u) 2 (u 3 0 u), is satisfied at all worlds in 
A: Suppose that for a formula u we have u and q (u 10 u) at some world w, . We 
want to show that 0 u holds at w,. Certainly, u must hold at the world w2 such 
that w, R, w2. For all formulas u, for all i, j such that 1 RI i and 1 R, j, that is, for 
all worlds accessible from world 1, u holds at world i if and only if v holds at world 
j. (The proof is a trivial inductive argument on the syntactic structure of U, where 
the base case concerns atomic formulas and the inductive step concerns formulas 
built up with the various connectives.) In particular, all worlds w3 such that w2 R, wj 
are indistinguishable from world w?. Therefore, u must hold at all i+j3 such that 
w2 R, wj. Since R, - (R, 0 R,) = {(w, w)l w E W} and u holds at w,, u holds at all 
w3 such that w, R, wi, that is, 0 u holds at w, . 
Intuitively, however, ug is true. In fact, it is true in the standard semantics, and 
even in the weak nonstandard semantics determined by t,, since t, P(Q). The 
basic idea behind the proof of P( ug) is that p(a( i), 0) implies p(a(s(i)), 0) for all 
i, so induction yields p(a(i), 0) for all i. Note that here p is interpreted at time 0 
while its argument a refers to other times. In the modal system where time is implicit 
this double reference is impossible; therefore, we cannot formulate a temporal 
version of the simple inductive proof just described within a classical language. n 
5. Auxiliary definitions 
As we showed in the previous section, To is surprisingly limited. An analysis of 
its incompleteness and of how informal temporal theorem proving is carried out 
gives rise to new rules. Similar rules can be added to other proposed FTL systems. 
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In the first subsection we describe two extensions of T,,. In the second subsection 
we give some preliminary completeness theorems, that we use to obtain stronger 
ones in Section 7. In the third subsection, we briefly discuss the connection between 
rules to discharge definitions and skolemization rules. 
5.1. Two systems with auxiliary dejinitions 
In practice, proofs often involve auxiliary predicate and function symbols. For 
instance, if we define the auxiliary rigid predicate q such that q(x) holds if and 
only if p(x) holds at the initial world, we obtain a proof for the sentence u0 exhibited 
in the previous incompleteness Theorem 4.5. We show that 0 q(a) holds inductively, 
and then use (Vx.0 a = x) to derive Vx.0 q(x). Since q is rigid, this simplifies to 
Vx.q(x). By the definition of q, we reach the desired conclusion, tlx.p(x). 
Useful auxiliary objects are not always rigid. In some cases, flexible objects have 
been introduced in informal proofs. Thus, Hailpern and Owicki have given inductive 
definitions for “history variables” and used them in proofs [14]. 
We propose to allow definitions for rigid and flexible auxiliary predicates in 
formal proofs. Some restrictive kinds of definitions are actually sufficient for com- 
pleteness purposes, but general forms seem more elegant and practical. Definitions 
for auxiliary functions could be formulated similarly. However, for simplicity, we 
derive them from definitions for predicates (since any provably functional predicate 
can be manipulated as the corresponding function). 
Rigid predicates are defined explicitly by formulas of the form 
vx,. .Vx,.p(x,, . .,XL)-U, 
where p is the new rigid predicate symbol being defined and p does not occur in u. 
For flexible predicates, we are content with primitive-recursive definitions of 
the form 
vx, . ..Vx..[p(x I,..., x,) = u AU((0 p(x,, . . , x,)) = v)], 
where p is the new flexible predicate symbol, p does not occur in u, and p does not 
occur in the scope of any modal operator in u. We also require that p does not 
occur in the scope of V or 1 in v in order to keep definitions simple; this requirement 
is essential for our soundness results and seems generally easy to satisfy in practice. 
These definitions are analogous to primitive-recursive definitions in classical logic. 
Sometimes we refer to them simply as recursive definitions. 
Definitions may be iterated, in the sense that defined symbols may be used in 
new definitions. 
Given a temporal language, we add an infinite supply of new rigid and flexible 
predicate symbols for definitions to use. We require that definitions define only 
these predicate symbols. Note that there is a largest (typically infinite) set D, of 
possible explicit definitions when only explicit definitions are considered, up to 
renaming of the defined predicate symbols. Similarly, there is a largest set D,, of 
56 M. Abadi 
possible explicit and recursive definitions when both explicit and recursive 
definitions are considered. 
We extend the Hilbert system TO with sound rules to exploit definitions. We allow 
the discharge of explicit definitions at the end of proofs to obtain the system T, 
and the concept t,, from TO and tT,: 
l If Er;, w then F~, w. 
l If k-r, (d 2 w) and ri defines a rigid predicate not occurring in w then t,, w. 
We allow the discharge of both explicit and primitive-recursive definitions at the 
end of proofs to obtain the system T2 and the concept t, from T, and tT>: 
l If tT, w then t, w. 
l If t, (d 2 w) and d defines a predicate not occurring in w then F~, w. 
Remark. We could allow the discharge of definitions at any point in proofs (rather 
than only at the end). However, this would unnecessarily complicate our proof 
systems. In particular, the soundness theorem of Section 7 would still apply as an 
upper bound on the power of T, and T2 after some minor modifications. 
5.2. Two very nonstandard completeness theorems 
Consider two models ./IX and &‘, with interpretation functions I and I’, respec- 
tively. We say that &’ expands 4 (or is an expansion of .U) if ./Id and YM’ are identical 
except that I’ extends I to give meanings to some new predicate and function 
symbols. Expansions preserve the meaning of formulas that do not contain the new 
symbols. 
5.1. Proposition. Zf Ad’ expands A! and the formula u does not contain any of the 
symbols that A’ interprets but A does not interpret, then A k UGA’ k u. 
Proof. We prove that for all assignments (Y and all worlds w 
(A!. cfpw k u a (.A’. a)@w k u 
by induction on the structure of U. Both the base case and the inductive step 
are trivial. n 
We say that JM’ e-expands .& if J@’ expands J! and satisfies each definition in D,. 
The model & is a model of T, if some model of T,, e-expands kt. Intuitively, models 
of T, are models of T,, that can be expanded to satisfy all explicit definitions while 
remaining models of T(,. 
T, is trivially sound with respect to models of T,. A set of formulas 2 is 
T,-consistent if bL, l(u, A . . . A u,) for all u,, . . , u, E 2. Theorem 4.1 immediately 
yields that T, is strongly complete with respect to models of T,. 
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5.2. Proposition (Very nonstandard strong completeness). If the set of formulas 1 
is T, -consistent then 2 holds in some model of T, . 
Proof. If 2 is T,-consistent, then “Lo, l(u, A . . . A u,) for all u, , . . . , u,, E 2. The rule 
for definitions guarantees that fLr,, l(d, A . . . A d, A u, A . . . A u,) for all u,, . . , u, E 
2 and d, , . . , d, E D,. Therefore, 2 u D, is TO-consistent, and has a model .& of 
T,, by Theorem 4.1. In particular, & satisfies E. Furthermore, since JZ e-expands 
itself, JX is also a model of T,. n 
Similarly, we say that JM’ er-expands Al if 4’ expands ,ti and satisfies each 
definition in D,,. The model ~6! is a model of T2 if some model of T, er-expands 
.I@. Intuitively, models of T, are models of To that can be expanded to satisfy all 
explicit and all recursive definitions while remaining models of T,,. 
T, is trivially sound with respect to models of T2. A set of formulas 2 is 
T,-consistent if hL, l( u, A . . . A u,) for all ul, . . . , u, E 2. Theorem 4.1 immediately 
yields that T2 is strongly complete with respect to models of T2. 
5.3. Proposition (Very nonstandard strong completeness). If the set of formulas 2 
is T2-consistent then Z holds in some model of T2. 
Proof. The argument is identical to the previous one. n 
Thus, models of T, and T2 can be expanded to satisfy all the appropriate definitions 
at once. As we argue now, they can also be expanded to satisfy any chosen definitions. 
Let Ju be a model of T, (or Tz), and +M’ one such “full” expansion. Given a subset 
of D, (or D,,) with definitions for the auxiliary predicates p, , pz, . . . , we may restrict 
the interpretation function in Ju’ to give meanings to the symbols in the original 
language, to p,, p2,. . , and to no other auxiliary symbol. The model we obtain, 
JR”, is an expansion of JZ% and a model of T, (or T2), since Ju’ is an e-expansion 
(or an er-expansion) of Jzz”. Therefore, models of T, and T2 can be expanded 
to satisfy arbitrary explicit or recursive definitions while remaining models of T, 
and Tz. 
5.3. On resolution systems 
In some resolution systems, skolemization has a role similar to that of the rules 
to discharge definitions because, intuitively, skolemization introduces an auxiliary 
function (instead of an auxiliary predicate). 
For instance, suppose that there is a resolution proof of (d 2 u), that is, a refutation 
of l(d 2 u), where d is a definition for the new rigid predicate p(x) with the formula 
w[x] (here x denotes a list of variables). We can construct a resolution proof of U, 
that is, a refutation of lu. Intuitively, we introduce a skolem function instead of a 
defined predicate. The skolem function maps x to some distinguished element a if 
and only if w[x] holds in the present. A slight complication arises in that we need 
to consider the trivial case where the domain contains a single element. 
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In particular, the resolution system R [l] includes a skolemization rule that 
introduces rigid skolem function symbols. Thus, our results on T, carry over to R. 
On the other hand, the resolution system of Abadi and Manna [3] does not include 
a skolemization rule and is analogous to r,,. 
6. Clocks and arithmetical formulas 
In this section we define the class of arithmetical formulas. We have a completeness 
result for arithmetical formulas for T,. Arithmetical formulas are also useful in the 
study of T2, although our completeness theorem for T2 is not restricted to arithmetical 
formulas. 
6.1. Definitions and examples 
Sometimes a clock is a useful device in proofs. For instance, a program counter 
may help us prove properties of a program even though the program never refers 
to the program counter. In some logics of programs, clocks are actually not only 
useful but sometimes necessary [23]. 
Informally, a clock is a formula c that distinguishes a set of tuples of elements 
of the domain at each point, without repetitions. The distinguished tuples in a world 
can be thought of as the “time” of that world. (For instance, the formula c[x] may 
be program-counter = x.) More precisely, c satisfies the clock condition 
C(c):(O 3LC[X])A(U vx.(c[x]=on1c[x])), 
where x is a list of variables. 
The formula c is a clock.for u if we can use C(c) to show u, that is, if we can 
prove C(c) 1 u then we can prove u (or, as we often say, “u reduces to C(c) 1 u”). 
More precisely, consider a proof concept t (for instance, one of kr;,, t,,, Ed?). 
The formula c is a clock for u in t if 
EC(c) 2 u implies Eu. 
Thus, the provability of u with a clock suffices to guarantee the provability of u. 
Note that we do not require that c be in the original temporal language under 
consideration: c may include auxiliary predicate symbols introduced in definitions. 
The formula u is arithmetical in t if there exists a clock for u in E (the name was 
chosen because arithmetical formulas have a most natural interpretation in arith- 
metical universes [ 111). 
Examples. (1) The formula 3x3~. (x f y) is trivially not arithmetical, in any sound 
system: it can be proved using a clock (if a clock exists, then the domain contains 
two distinct values) but not without a clock. We do not know of more subtle examples 
of formulas which are not arithmetical. 
(2) Consider tT,. Suppose we are interested in 
U: [A~OVz.(a=z~Oa>z)] = V_v.Oa>y, 
where A is some basic collection of axioms about arithmetic, a is a flexible constant 
symbol, and all other symbols are rigid. The formulas in the antecedent, A and 
0 Vz. (a = z 2 0 a > z), imply that a must take a different value at each instant. 
Therefore, we can prove 
[A~OVz.(u=z~Ou>z)] 1 C(u=x), 
and derive [ C(u = x) 3 U] 1 u by propositional reasoning. Therefore, a = x is a clock 
for u. 
(3) Consider t,. Suppose we are interested in 
u: [Vx.(s(x)#O)AVxvy.(s(x)=s(y)~x=y)] 2 21 
for some formula U. For instance, we may imagine that u expresses some temporal 
property of programs on numbers, and that is why some basic facts about 0 and s 
appear in U. In T2, we can give a definition dc for a flexible predicate c that is a 
clock for u: 
vx.[(c(x)=(x=o))Acl((o c(x))-3y.(c(J’)Ax=s(y)))]. 
Intuitively, c is the clock that gives the times 0, 1, 2,. . . . Note that 
[Vx.(s(x)#O) ~VxVy.(s(x)=s(y)~x=y) A d,.] 3 C(c) 
is provable in T2. 
(*) 
To check that c is a clock for U, we simply need to reduce u to C(c) 3 u. Suppose 
that C(c) 2 u has a proof in T2. Let D be the conjunction of the definitions involved 
in this proof and in the proof of (*). Then (DA C(c)) 3 u is provable in To. By 
propositional reasoning, 
[Vx.(s(x)#O)AVXVy.(s(X)=s(y)~x=y)Ad,.~D] 2 u 
and hence (d, A D) 3 u are also provable in To. We discharge the 
conclude that u is provable in T,. 
definitions, to 
As the examples suggest, many of the formulas that arise in reasoning about 
computations are arithmetical. For the systems T,, and T, it suffices that the formulas 
in question mention some (provably) nonrepeating term-which may represent a 
program counter or just some program variable. Furthermore, all instances of valid 
PTL schemas are trivially arithmetical, since they are provable. It is therefore 
reasonable to suggest that many important FTL formulas are arithmetical in Ed, 
and k7,. 
For the system of most interest to us, T,, arithmetical formulas are even easier 
to find. Typically, infinite-state systems operate on domains such as the integers, 
the lists, or the strings. By Proposition 6.1 (below), formulas that involve some basic 
theory of such a domain are arithmetical in kT2. This basic theory needs to refer 
only to elementary facts about a “successor” operation, e.g., successor for integers, 
concatenation for lists and for strings; intuitively, this “successor” operation suffices 
to construct a clock, that ticks by applying the operation to its current value. 
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Given a formula s,,[x, y], where x and y have the same length, let Inj(s,) denote 
tlxVyVz.((s,[x,y] A SJX, z]) =y = z) 
A vxtlyvz. (( S,‘[X, z] A SP[ y, z]) = x = y) 
AVxVy.0(.~,[x,y]=0 sJx,y]) 
and Range(s,) c Domain (s,,) denote 
The formula Irzi(s,,) asserts that .F,, denotes a rigid injective partial function; the 
formula Range(.r,)c Domain(s,,) that there is at least one “O-like” element to start 
a sequence of function applications. 
6.1. Proposition. If t,> [( Inj(s,,) A (Range(s,,) c Domuin( .sr))) 1 U] 1 u jar some 
formula s,,[x, y] then u is arithmetical in F ,, . 
Proof. The flexible predicate c is defined by 
vX.[(C(X)~3y.S,,[X,y] AvZ.l.S,[Z, X]) An((o C(X))-$‘.(C(J’)A S&,X]))]. 
The clock condition C(c) can be proved from Inj(sp) A (Runge(s,) c Domuin(s,)) 
and the definition of c. As in the previous example, the reduction of u to C(c) 1 u 
follows by propositional reasoning and definition discharges. n 
6.2. A basic theorem 
Intuitively, we would like to know that many formulas are arithmetical, because 
this makes completeness arguments easier: since we may use clocks to prove 
arithmetical formulas, these formulas may be easier to prove than arbitrary ones. 
As pointed out above, both valid propositional formulas and formulas that refer to 
a “successor” operation are arithmetical. In practice, most formulas fall into one 
of these two groups; this informal observation has a formal counterpart, which is 
the central idea in the following proof that all valid formulas are arithmetical in T:. 
6.2. Theorem. If bu then u is arithmetical in k,-,. 
Proof. We prove the theorem for formulas with no function symbols. A proposition 
in the Appendix shows that this restriction does not entail any loss of generality. 
We suppose that b u but u is not arithmetical in F ,> and derive a contradiction. 
Since u is not arithmetical in tT2, for all formulas c we have that kT2 C(c) 3 u but 
FT2 U. The completeness of T2 for models of Tz yields that lu holds in some model 
..ti/ of T?. Now we argue that .U must be rather simple. Later on we derive that 1u 
holds in some standard model II,, thus contradicting the assumption + u. 
Given an n-ary predicate symbol p we expand 4 
2n-ary symbol <, defined by 
x<y = [(7(x) A P(Y)) CPJ (P(X) A 7(Y))]. 
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with a relation for the rigid 
Intuitively, x is less than jj if, the first time that p distinguishes one from the other, 
p is false for x and true for y. In other words, x is less than y if the sequence of 
values of p at x is lexicographically less than the sequence of values of p at Y. 
We also expand .6! with relations for the associated equivalence relation = and 
the associated order s: 
x=y = 1(x<yvy<x), 
xsy = (x-yvx<y). 
Suppose that the relation < gives rise to an infinite chain of tuples of elements 
in the domain. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the chain is infinite 
“forward” (otherwise, we consider > instead). Now we define a successor function 
after the (arbitrary) starting point z: 
s(x,y) = [2~x/\x<j’Avx,.(x,~xvY~x,)]. 
A clock can be constructed: 
(c(x) = (x==z)) AO((0 c(x))-3y.(c(j’) AS(j~,X))). 
The expansion of .W we obtain satisfies C(c), still satisfies lu, and still is a model 
of T2. On the other hand, C(c) 3 u holds in all models of T,, since kr: C(c) 1 u. 
Thus, we derive a contradiction. Hence, < cannot give rise to infinite chains. 
This implies that for each predicate symbol p in u there are only finitely many 
=-equivalence classes. In other words, for each p there are only finitely many 
possible patterns for p(x) as x varies. This allows us to “split” p into a rigid 
component and a flexible propositional component. 
The model .ti can be expanded with time-independent relations for the rigid 
symbols r,, . . . , r, ; we define r,(x) to hold if x is in the equivalence class i. Also, 
we can introduce relations for the flexible proposition symbols q,, . . . , q,, to rep- 
resent the possible patterns of p(x). More precisely, q, is true in a certain world if 
p holds for the x’s in the equivalence class i in that world. After all these expansions 
to .6L!, we have a model ~‘4’ of 1~. 
In .6/‘, 
q vx. 
[ 
P(X) = ,JdL (rl(x) A 4) . 1 (*I 
For each predicate symbol p there is a different number k and a different set of 
defined symbols r,, . . , r,, q,, . . . , qk for which a similar equivalence holds. 
The original formula 1u can be rewritten using the equivalences (*): each atomic 
formula is replaced with the corresponding disjunction. The formula obtained, U, 
is equivalent to 1~ in all models where the equivalences hold. 
62 M. Abadi 
An inductive argument on the structure of v shows that v is equivalent to a 
Boolean combination of propositional temporal formulas and formulas where all 
symbols are rigid. Typical transformations are to rewrite q ( u, v uz) to U, v 0 u2, if 
u, is rigid, and to rewrite Vx. (u, v u2) to (Vx. u,) v u2, if u2 is propositional. Therefore, 
u is equivalent to a formula of the form 
with u; rigid and u; propositional for all i. 
Since v holds in JH’, for some i the formulas u; and ui must hold in X’. By the 
standard completeness theorem for PTL [9] ui must also have a standard model. 
We may take this model with the same domain and the same interpretation of rigid 
symbols as .M’-since these choices do not affect the truth-value of the formulas u; 
and the model remains standard. Finally, the model can be expanded with relations 
for the flexible predicate symbols defined with the equivalences (*). The model we 
obtain is .,a,. Since u; and u; hold in _ti,, u holds as well. Since the equivalences 
hold, _@, satisfies 1~. Thus, we have constructed a standard model for lu and 
contradicted the hypothesis that ku. n 
Remark. The proof of Theorem 6.2 requires that the logic include the operator Y, 
even if the formula u under consideration includes only 0, q , and 0. Fortunately, 
we can refine the proof to guarantee that the theorem holds even for a logic without 
11 and 9. The only step we reformulate is the definition of the rigid predicate 
symbol <. 
First we define the flexible predicate symbol p,(x, y) so that p,(x, J’) holds if and 
only if p(x) alp has already held, that is, 
Similarly, we define pJx,y) so that p,(x,y) holds if and only if lp(x) up has 
already held. Then < is defined by 
x<Y - o[P2(X,4’)Alp,(X,y)]. 
7. Soundness and completeness 
The main results of this section are the soundness and completeness of t,, and 
+-r, with respect to t,, and t-,, respectively. The completeness theorem for krr, 
refers only to arithmetical formulas. The more important completeness theorem for 
trZ applies to all formulas. 
The soundness theorem states that modal temporal reasoning can be transformed 
into classical reasoning with explicit time parameters; in fact, the transformation is 
based on a step by step simulation. 
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7.1. Theorem (Soundness). For every formula u, 
t,, u + koP(u) and krz u =+ kpP(u). 
Proof. The argument is similar for both systems. A modal proof of u consists of a 
proof within T,, and some definition discharges within T, or T2. We show how to 
simulate the first part (classically) and how to eliminate the second part. 
(A) First, we show how to construct a classical proof of P(0 v) from a modal 
proof of v in T,, for an arbitrary v. The construction proceeds by induction on the 
structure of the proof of v. We consider 0 v rather than v in order to handle the 
case where the last rule in the proof is the one that introduces 0. The extra q is 
easy to delete at the end of this construction, that is, if P(U v) is provable then so 
is P(v). 
(1) For all axioms v of T,,, P(0 v) is provable: 
(i) Let v be an instance of a schema valid in PTL. A completeness result for 
PTL [9] enables us to consider only the cases where v is one of a few simple axioms 
for PTL. All of the proofs are routine. 
(ii) Let v be an instance of u = 0 u for some rigid formula U. Then P(0 v) = 
Vi 3 O.[P*(u, i) = P*(u, s(i))]. Since u is rigid, the systems of arithmetic prove 
P*( u, m) = P*( u, m’) for any m and m’ (this can easily be checked with an induction 
on the structure of u). It immediately follows that they prove P(i? V) as well. 
(iii) Let v be an equality axiom. Then P(0 v) =VisO. P*(v, i) and P*(v, i) is 
one of 
(x=x), 
(x=y1y=x), 
(x=y/!y=z~x=z), 
(x=yI p*(t, i)0= P*(t, i)), 
(x = y 1 P*( w, i)@ = P*( w, i)), 
for some term t and some formula w, where 0 = {x + y} and y does not occur bound 
in w. In all cases, P*(v, i) is a classical equality axiom; therefore, the systems of 
arithmetic prove P*(v, i), and hence P(lZ v). 
(iv) Let v be 3x.l~ = IVX. w. Then 
P(U v)=ViSO.(3x.iP*(w, i)-iVx.P*(w, i)). 
Since the systems of arithmetic properly include the predicate calculus, they certainly 
prove 3x.lP*(w, i) = 1Vx. P*( w, i) for any P*( w, i), and hence P(U v). 
(v) Let v be (Vx. w) 1 w0 for some formula w and some substitution 0 = {x + r} 
that does not create any new bound occurrences of variables or any occurrences of 
flexible terms in the scope of modal operators in w. Either x does not occur in the 
scope of modal operators in w or t does not contain any flexible symbols. In either 
case, 
P*( we, i) = P*( w, i){x + P*( t, i)}. 
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Then 
P(0 v) = Vi~O.[(VX.P”(W, i))I(P*(w, i){xtP*(t, i)})]. 
The quantifiers in P*( w, i) are those in w and some additional quantifiers over 
numbers. The former could not bind any of the data variables in P”(r, i), since 
these variables occur in t and the rule application does not create any new bound 
occurrences of variables in the original modal proof. The latter could not bind any 
number variables in P*( t, i), since the substitution does not create any new occurren- 
ces of flexible terms in modal contexts. Therefore, {x + P*( t, i)} does not create any 
new bound occurrences of variables in P”(w, i). Since the systems of arithmetic 
properly include the predicate calculus, they certainly prove 
(Vx. P”( w, i)) 1 (P*( w, i){x + P*( t, i)}), 
that is, (Vx. P*(w, i)) 1 P*(wB, i), and hence P(U v). 
(vi) Let u be (t/x.0 U) = (0 Vx. u). Note that 
P”((Vx.0 u), i) = VxVj. (sr( i,j) 1 P*( u,j)), 
P*((OVx.u),i) = V,j.(sr(i,j)~Vx.P*(u,j)), 
and that these two formulas are provably equivalent. The provability of P(0 v) 
follows. 
(vii) Let u be [Vx.(u % u’)] = [(Vx. u) O21 u’], with x not free in u’. As in the 
previous case, P*(Vx.(u O21 u’), i) and P*((Vx. u) % u’, i) are provably equivalent. 
The provability of P(Cl u) follows. 
(2) All rules in r,, can be simulated (e.g., if we can infer w from v then we can 
infer P(U w) from P(Cl u)): 
(i) Assume that P(0 w,)) and P (U( wg 1 w,)) are provable to show that P(U w,) 
is provable as well. We have 
P(D w,,) = Vi3O.P*(w,,,i), 
P(O(w,,x w,)) = ViZO.(P*(w,,, i) 3 P*(w,, i)). 
By classical reasoning it follows that 
Vi30.[P*(wo, i) A (P”(w,,, i) 3 P*(w,, i))]: 
and then Vi 3 0. P*( w, , i), that is, P(0 w,). 
(ii) Assume that P(0 w) is provable to show that P(U q w) is provable as well. 
The formula P(U w) 1 P(U q w), that is, 
Vi3O.P*(w,i)I(Vi3O)(VjJji).P*(w,j), 
is provable, since kc1 (i 3 0 A j 3 i) 1 j 2 0. Hence, we can prove P(0 Cl w). 
(iii) Assume that P(lIl(w,,~ w,)) is provable and x is not free in w,, to show that 
P(Cl(w,,=Vx. w,)) is provable as well. We have 
P(O(w,,~w,))=Vi~O.(P*(w,,i)~P*(w,,i)). 
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Since ~~ Vi.(iz 0), it follows that P*(w,,, i) 3 P*( w, , i) is provable. The variable 
x is not free in P*( wO, i), since it is not free in w,). By the classical rule of introduction 
for V, we derive P*( wO, i) =) Vx. P*( w, , i), that is, P*( wO, i) 3 P*(Vx. w, , i). There- 
fore, we can prove 
ViaO.[P*(w,, i) 3 P*(Vx. w,, i)], 
that is, P(Cl( wO 3 Vx. w,)). 
(B) We have transformed the part within TO of a proof of u into an analogous 
classical proof. In the modal proof of u we discharge definitions to obtain the final 
result u from some theorem of T,,. We show that definitions are superfluous in the 
classical proof of P(u), that is, if d is a definition and P(d 2 u) is provable then 
so is P(v). 
Case I: If d is an explicit definition and to P(d 1 v) then fiO P(v): Assume 
that t, P(d IV). We have 
P(d = 0) = [P(d) = P(v)], 
and P(d) is of the form 
Vx, . Vxk.p(xIy.. . )X,) = w[x,, . . .) x,]. 
We may replace every occurrence of p( t, , . . . , t,) >ith the corresponding instance 
w[t,, . . , t,] in the proof of ~~ P(d) 1 P( v)-possibly after some renaming of 
bound variables to avoid unwanted captures. Every step of the proof is still legal 
since k-O does not distinguish P( t, , . . . , t,) from w[ t, , . . . , t,]. We obtain a proof of 
+<> (Vx, . , vx,,. w = w) 2 P(u), 
and, therefore, a proof of +(I P(v). 
Case 2: If d is a recursive definition and t,P(d 1 u) then i-, P(v): Assume that 
t,, P(d 1 u). We have 
P(d = u) = [P(d) 3 P(u)], 
and P(d) is the primitive-recursive definition for a predicate symbol p. By classical 
coding techniques from Peano Arithmetic [ 16, Sections 48 and 491, p is also definable 
explicitly, say by d’. The definition d’ is of the form 
Vx, . . . VxkVi.p(x,, . . .,x,, i) = w[x,, . . .,x,, i]. 
Furthermore, t,, d’ = P(d), and hence also k-p d’ 2 P(u). As above, we may replace 
every occurrence ofp( t, , . . . , t,, m) with the corresponding instance w[ t, , . . , f,, ml 
in the proof of k-p d’ 3 P(v). Again, every step of the proof is still legal. We obtain 
a proof of 
+p (Vx, . . . Vx,Vi. w = w) 3 P(u), 
and, therefore, a proof of kp P(u). n 
The completeness theorem, converse to the soundness theorem, states that classical 
reasoning with explicit time parameters can be transformed into modal temporal 
reasoning. The transformation is more than a trivial simulation, though; in particular, 
we exploit the existence of clocks. 
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7.2. Theorem (Completeness). (1) For every formula u, k. P(u) + kT, u if u is 
arithmetical in F-T,. 
(2) For everyformula u, k-P P(u) j i-, u. 
Proof. Since the translation function P preserves standard validity and k,, is sound, 
FP P(U) implies that +u, and hence that u is arithmetical in tT2. Therefore, it 
suffices to prove that for every arithmetical formula u (with clock c) to P(U) a t,, u 
and kP P(u) =+ Ed, u. The main steps of the proof are: 
(1) we use the clock to define some predicates and functions on the domain 
(0, s, s, and = for T,, and also + and x for T7); 
(2) these predicates and functions satisfy the usual properties of 0, s, G, =, +, 
X, and this can be shown within T, and T2; 
(3) the clock also helps translate u into a FTL formula Q(U) syntactically similar 
to P(u); 
(4) furthermore, Q(U) can be shown equivalent to u within T, , so it suffices to 
construct a proof of Q(u); 
(5) the proof of Q(u) is identical in structure to that of P(u), except that the 
usual axioms about 0, s, etc., are treated as theorems. 
We present the completeness proof step by step. We may assume that there are 
no function symbols-though we use some as abbreviations. A proposition in the 
Appendix checks that this entails no loss of generality. Also, at some points we 
claim that certain formulas are provable within T, and leave the corresponding 
arguments for the Appendix. 
Step 1 
(1) First we define the rigid numberhood predicate n by t/x. [ n(n) 3 0 c[x]]. 
(2) We define the rigid zero predicate 0, by Vx.[O,(x) = c[x]]. 
(3) We define the rigid successor predicate s,, by 
vXVy.[sP(x,y)=o(c[x]Ao c[y])]. 
(4) Similarly, we define xsy as O(c[x] A 0 c[y]). 
(5) Also, we define x=y as O(c[x] A c[y]). The relation = is intended as an 
approximation to =. 
(6) In T,, primitive-recursive definitions can be exploited to define the rigid 
predicate +,,. First we define the flexible predicate p, by 
~~~Y.~P,~~,Y~~~~=Y~~~~~~P,~~,Y~~~~z.~Pl~~,z~~~,~z,Y~~~l. 
Intuitively, p,(x, y) holds at time k if x+ k =y. Therefore, we define +P by 
vX~YvZ.[+,(X, Y, Z) = o(C[Yl A P,(X> Z))l. 
(7) Similarly, xP can be defined in T,. First we define the flexible predicate p2 by 
~~~Y.[P,(~,Y)--o,(Y)~~((oPz(~,Y))--~z.(P*(~, z) A +p (Z,X,Y)))l. 
Intuitively, p2(x, y) holds at time k if x x k = y. Therefore, we define X, by 
vXvYvZ.[x,(X, Y, Z) = o(C[Yl A Pz(X, Z))l. 
Step 2. The defined symbols can be shown to satisfy most of their usual axioms 
within T,. One important qualification is that the full substitutivity-of-equals 
property does not hold for ==. However, the substitutivity properties we obtain are 
sufficient for our purposes. Similarly, enough (but not all) instances of the induction 
schema can be proved; rigid predicate definitions are essential in these proofs. 
More precisely, let A represent the definitions for auxiliary predicates (A includes 
the definitions for n, O,, s,,, G, and =; when addition and multiplication are involved, 
A also includes the definitions for p,, +,,, p2, and x,,). Then 
kr, (C(c) A A) 3 3x. n(x). 
This guarantees that the predicate n can be treated as a sort. Any proof of u using 
n as a sort can be transformed into a proof where n is a predicate (this is justified 
in a proposition presented in the Appendix). From now on, we denote variables of 
this sort by letters like i, and terms of this sort by letters like m. 
We write 3, i. u[ i] as an abbreviation for 
Zli.u[i]r\ViVj.[u[i]Au[j]~i-j]. 
The predicates O,, s,,, +,,, and X, can be thought of as functions on the sort defined 
by n: 
+r, (C(C)AA) 2 !lii.O,(i), 
bT1 (C(c)r\A) 1 VElj.s,(i,j), 
kT,(C(c)~A) 2 ViVjgik.+,(i,j,k), 
ET, (C(C) A A) = ViVjj3,k. x, (i, j, k). 
Therefore, it is convenient to use the functional abbreviations 0, s, +, x for O,, s,,, 
+,,, x,,, just as in Lo and Le. 
Also, = is an equivalence relation and enjoys some useful substitutivity properties; 
= acts like = on the sort defined by n: 
kT,(C(c)~A) 2 Vi.(i-i), 
t,, (C(C)AA) 1 ViVj.(i=jzj=i), 
t,(c(c)~A) 2 ViVjVk.((i=jAj=k)Ti=k), 
k,(C(c)nA) 2 ViVj.(i-jIO(c[i]Aa)-O(c[j]~a)) 
if a is atomic, 
+-r, (C(c)r\A) 1 ViVj.(i-j~a[i]-a[j]), 
if a is an atomic formula with predicate symbol n, O,, s,,, G, =, +,,, 
or x,. 
We say that a formula is c-formed if it is built up from atomic formulas either 
with rigid relation symbol or with relation symbol n, O,, s,,, G, =, +,,, and x,, and 
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from formulas of the form 0( c[ m] A a), where a is atomic. The substitutivity property 
we need follows from the last two facts by induction: 
t,, (C(c) A A) 2 ViV,j. (i -,j 2 u[ i] = u[j]) if u is c-formed. 
Other theorems guarantee that the defined symbols satisfy the appropriate axioms: 
t,, (C(C)AA) 1 Vi.(s(i)#O), 
E,-,(C(c)r,A) 1 ViVj.(s(i)==s(j)Ii=j), 
kr-, (C(~)AA) 2 Vi.((isO)=(i=O)), 
i-,, (C(C)AA) 1 ViVj.(i<s(j)=(i==s(j)vi~j)): 
kT, (CAM) 1 Vi.(i+O==i), 
i--,, (C(c)r\A) 2 b’iVj.(i+s(j)==s(i+j)), 
kT, (C(c)r\A) 1 Vi.(ixO=O), 
kT, (C(c)r\A) 2 ViVj.(i~s(j)=ixj+i), 
t,; (C(C)A A) 1 [u[O]r\ (Vi.u[i] 2 u[s(i)])I(Vi.u[i])] 
if u is c-formed. 
Step 3. We define the translation function Q by Q(U) = Q*( U, 0), where Q* is an 
auxiliary translation function such that 
Q”(P(f,, ‘. > f/c), ml = 
if p is a rigid predicate symbol, 
O(C[m]AP(r,, . . , IL)) 
if p is a flexible predicate symbol, 
Q*(o u, m) = Q*(U, s(m)), 
Q*(tl u, m) = Via m. Q*(u, i) (i and j are new variables), 
Q*(O u, m) = 3iS m.Q*(u, i), 
Q*(u02/v,m) = ViSm.[Q*(u,i)v3j.(m=SjGinQ*(v,j))], 
Q*(uPv,m) = Zli2m.[Q*(u,i)AVj.(mSj=Si~~Q*(v,j))], 
and Q* renames bound variables and preserves connectives and quantifiers 
Step 4. The function Q provably preserves meaning. First we prove Lemma 7.3. 
7.3. Lemma 
+T7., (C(C)AA) 2 (Q*(u, m)-O(c[m]r, u)) ,for all u and m. 
Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on the structure of U. It suffices to show that 
~7, (C(c) A A) = O*(P(~,, . , h), m)-O(c[ml AP(~,, . . . , &)I, 
t,, (C(C)AA) 3 Q*(Tu, m)=O(c[m]~~u), 
k-r, (C(c) A A) = o*(u, A ~2, m) = o(c[ml A (u, A ud), 
FT, (C(c)r,A) = Q*(u, v ~2, m)=O(c[m]A(u, v UZ)), 
kT, (C(c)AA) 1 Q*(Vx.U, m)-O(C[m]AVX.U), 
ET, (C(C)A A) 1 Q”(3X.q m)=o(C[m]~3X.U), 
F,(C(C)AA) 2 Q*(Ou,m)=O(c[m]AOu), 
kT, (C(C)AA) = Q*(O u,m)=O(c[m]r\[7 u), 
~~~ (C(C)AA) 1 Q*(O u, m)-O(c[m]r\O u), 
ET, (C(C)AA) 1 Q*(U%21,m)=o(C[m]~u~tiU), 
k,(C(c)r\A) 2 Q*(u6Pqm)~O(c[m]~uPu), 
with the induction hypothesis that the lemma holds for all proper subformulas of 
the formulas under consideration. 
By the induction hypothesis, it suffices to show that 
Ed, (C(C)AA) 1 p(t ,,..., tk)=O(c[m]r\p(t ,,..., tk)) ifp is rigid, 
tT, (c(C) A A) 3 O(C[ml AP(t,, . . . , h)) = O(C[ml A P(t,, . . . , k)) 
if p is flexible, 
k-r, (C(C)AA) 3 lO(C[m]AU)=O(C[m]AlU), 
+T, (c(c) A A) = (O(c[m] A U,) A O(c[m] A Uz)) = O(c[m] A (U, A Uz)), 
+T, (c(c) A A) = (O(c[m] A U,) V O(c[m] A 4)) = O(c[m] A (UI V U,)), 
kT, (C(C)AA) 3 ‘dx’.O(c[m]r\ u[x’])-O(c[m]~Vx.u[x]) 
if x’ is a new variable (in particular, x’ does not occur in c[m]), 
t,, (C(c)r\A) 3 3x’.O(c[m]nu[x’])-O(~[~]A~X.U[X]) 
if x’ is a new variable (in particular, x’ does not occur in c[m]), 
k-,,(c(c)~A) IJ O(c[s(m)]r\u)-O(c[m]r\Ou), 
E,(C(C)AA) 3 Vizm.O(c[i]r\u)-O(c[m]AU u), 
fir, (c(c)~A) 3 3i~m.O(c[i]Au)=O(c[m]AO u), 
ET, (c(c) A A) = 
~i3m.[O(c[i]~U)v~j.(m~j~iAO(c[j]Av))] 
-O(c[m]nuOUu) I 
> 
tr, (c(c) A A) 3 
3i~m.[O(c[i]~u)A~j.(m~j~i~lO(c[j]AV))] 
-O(c[m]Au!Yu) 
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The second formula is trivially provable. Duality considerations enable us to omit 
the cases for v, 3, 0, and 9’. Also, the case for 0 is subsumed by the case for Ou 
and can be omitted. The remaining cases are treated in the Appendix. n 
7.4. Theorem. t,,(C(c)r\A)~(u~Q(u))forallu. 
Proof. In the Appendix we check that 
Ed, (C(c)r\A) 3 (u-O(c[O]r\u)) for all u. 
The lemma yields 
kr, (C(C)AA) 2 (u-Q*(u,O)) for all u. 
Now it suffices to point out that Q*( u, 0) = Q(U). W 
Step 5. The formula u is provable if (C(c) A A) 1 u is provable (in the appropriate 
system). By Step 4, it suffices to show that (C(c) A A) 1 Q(u) is provable. 
The formulas Q(u) and P(u) have identical syntactic structures, except that 
formulas of the form O(c[m] A p( t,, , Q)) occur in Q(u) where atoms of the 
form p(t,, . . . , fk, m) occur in p(u). This difference is insignificant enough that the 
proof for P(U) can be applied to (C(c) A A) 3 Q(u), with four minor modifications: 
l The assumption C(c) A A is carried along. 
l The equality symbol for numbers, =, is replaced with ==. 
l Ifp is an uninterpreted predicate symbol then the atom p( t, , . . , tkr m) is replaced 
with O(c[m]Ap(t ,,..., rk)). 
l The axioms about numbers are no longer treated as axioms, but they are proved 
from C(c) A A (as in Step 2). Note that since all formulas in the proof of Q(u) 
are c-formed, the substitutivity and induction properties we obtain suffice. n 
This concludes the proof of the completeness theorem. As a corollary, we can 
show that r, is strictly less powerful than T, and T, is strictly less powerful than 
T2. Of course, all systems are incomplete in the standard sense. 
7.5. Corollary. kz,c t,, c k,c b. 
Proof. The inclusion of all the proof concepts in b is a consequence of their 
soundness. Since they are all effective, they are incomplete; hence their inclusion 
in + is proper. 
It is trivial that tTjs br, G t,, since T,, is a subsystem of T, and T, is a subsystem 
of T2. Also, there are formulas u, and u2 to separate bTi, from t,, and t,, from 
t l-2 > respectively. 
For u,, take 
[(kiX.OU=X)A(VX.[7(U=X~O~ U#X)) 
AJl(U)A(tfXtlJJ.(fl(X)AO(U=XA OU=y))Ifl(y))] 
= (VX.P(X)). 
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Note that u, is very similar to u0 exhibited for the nonstandard incompleteness 
Theorem 4.5 (we introduce a slight difference to make U, obviously arithmetical). 
In fact, the arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.5 show that bL,, u, and b0 P(u,), 
with no modification. Also, the formula U, is arithmetical in T,, with clock (a =x). 
By the completeness theorem, it follows that I+,, u, and +rl u,. 
As for u2, Biro and Sain [4] have produced a formula ZI of Lo such that t/o 2, 
and +p u. It is an immediate observation that u is the translation of a FTL formula, 
say u2. By our soundness and completeness theorems, it follows that bLT, u2 
and k-rz u2. n 
Remark. Consider the restrictions of T, and T2 that do not operate on formulas 
with % and 9. The completeness theorem and its corollary hold for these restricted 
systems. In fact, the proofs are special cases of the general proofs. Note, in particular, 
that we have pointed out that all valid formulas are arithmetical in t, even when 
the logic does not include %! and .Y. 
8. Related work 
The intractability of FTL has been widely accepted for some time. However, no 
intractability proof has been published to the best of our knowledge. 
In dynamic logic, the intractability theorems initially led to an interest in complete- 
ness results for arithmetical universes [ 111. We suspect these results do not carry 
over directly to temporal logic. On the other hand, the interesting literature on 
nonstandard logics of programs (e.g., [4,21,27,28]) discusses notions of complete- 
ness similar to those we study. 
Previous works on nonstandard temporal logics differ from ours in three major 
respects. First, the logics under consideration often include the modal operator 
First, but not 021 and .Y, and the only flexible symbols are constant symbols. Second, 
the works focus on weak FTL proof systems, similar to To and T,. Third, the main 
soundness and completeness theorems given are for special classes of sentences, 
such as partial and total correctness assertions for deterministic sequential programs. 
For instance, these theorems do not directly apply to reasoning about concurrent 
systems. 
There have been results analogous to ours for other modal logics. In particular, 
Solovay [29] has provided an interpretation of the propositional logic of provability 
in Peano Arithmetic. Although our main positive result seems close in style and 
form to Solovay’s, the constructions used in the proofs have little in common. 
Another fundamental difference is that the logic Solovay considers is axiomatizable, 
while temporal logic is highly intractable. 
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9. Open questions 
The system we are most interested in is T2, because it corresponds well both to 
Peano Arithmetic and to informal proof methods, and because it is the most powerful 
one of those we have considered. Still, there are some intriguing open questions on 
T,, and T, : 
(1) We have shown that Em, is incomplete with respect to t,,. Is there any simple 
characterization of T,,? 
(2) We would like to know whether T, is actually complete for all formulas (and 
not just for arithmetical formulas). Consider augmenting T, with a rule to use a 
clock, that is, to derive u from C(c) 1 u provided that the flexible predicate symbol 
c does not occur in U. As long as the domain of discourse is infinite, the rule is 
harmless. With this rule, all formulas become arithmetical, and hence E ,, becomes 
complete with respect to E(]. Thus, we would would like to know whether a clock 
adds power to T, 
Appendix 
In the following Subsections A.1 and A.2 we prove two general propositions 
to show how to replace function symbols with predicate symbols and predicates 
with sorts. These are simple extensions of propositions well known in classical 
logic [7, 161. 
In Subsection A.3 we argue that certain formulas can be proved within T,. 
A. 1. Eliminating .function symbols 
Given a formula u and a set F of uninterpreted function symbols in a given 
language, we define the “unnesting” of u, u*, to be the formula obtained by 
repeatedly replacing occurrences of 
PC. . 3 t[.f(t, 3 . . . , L)l, . .) 
with 
3x.[f’(t,, . . , t,) =x/\p(. . .) t[x], . .,I, 
where ,f‘r F and x is a new variable, until all ,f”s in F occur only in atomic formulas 
of the form .f( t,, . , t,,) = x. For the sake of uniqueness, we may choose a standard 
order for this rewriting. 
Now u* can be transformed into a formula u’ with no function symbols in F: 
for each .f E F, we replace ,f( t,, . . , t,,) = x with 9, (t, , . , t,,, x). Let F,, be the set 
of elements of F that occur in u. The formula 
A [O vx, . VX,,3!_r.9,(.U,, . . ) x,,, y,] 
II f,, 
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expresses that all the predicate symbols introduced represent functions, (For rigid 
f’s, the 0 may be omitted.) Thus, 
u’: (4, [O Vx, . .Vx,El!y.q,(x,, . . . ,x,,y)] = u’ 
c /< 
is equivalent to the original U. 
When the language is sorted, U’ is defined analogously and the new symbols 
introduced are taken in the appropriate sorts. 
A.1. Proposition. Let k be one of ko, C,, Em,,, kT,, and kT,. For everyformula u, 
tu e tu’. 
Proof, To prove that tu =+ k-u’, we assume that u has a proof and construct a 
proof for u’. The construction proceeds by induction on the structure of a proof 
for u. More precisely, we check that if v is an axiom then U’ is provable and that 
if a rule derives z, from v,, . . . , uk then v’ can be obtained from v’,, . . . , vi. The 
usual classical arguments are omitted. We present only the arguments for the 
temporal axioms and rules. 
If u is an instance of a valid PTL schema, of u = 0 u (with u rigid), of (Vx.0 u) = 
(0 Vx. u), or of [Vx. (u % u)] = [(Vx. u) Q u], then ui is an instance of the same 
schema, and, therefore, is an axiom. The axiom vi immediately yields v’. 
Suppose ZJ is 0 w and is deduced from ~1. Clearly, U w’ can be deduced from 
u”. By propositional temporal reasoning, ~(0 w’) = (0 M/‘)‘, so (0 w)’ can be 
deduced from w’. 
Suppose u is deduced from d 3 L;, for a definition d. Since dt is also a definition, 
U’ can be deduced from d’ 3 u’. By propositional reasoning, +(d 3 u)‘- (d’ 1 u’). 
Therefore, U’ can be deduced from (d 2 u)‘. 
To prove the other direction, tu’ 3 EU, we assume that tu’ and show that tu. 
Let v be u’ with .f’( t, , . . , t,,) = I,, + , substituted for q,( t, , . t ) for all ,f‘t F. ., n+, 3 
Clearly, the same proof succeeds for u and u’, since they have the same structure; 
thus, E-Z,. In all systems under consideration functions are provably functional. In 
particular, 
+ /j [O Vx,. .Vxn3!y.J‘(x,,. . . ,x,,)=,v]. 
I< F,, 
Since u = A,G_k-,, [Cl Vx, . . . Vx,,El!y.f(x,, . . . , x,) = y] 1 u*, it follows that EU*. 
Now, it suffices to show that +u = u*. It suffices to point out that each step of 
the “unnesting” is provably correct, that is, 
FP(. . . 3 f[.f(t, 3 . . . 7 r,)], . .) = 3x.[f(t,, . . . ) t,)==xAp( . ..) t[x] ‘... )]. n 
This proposition guarantees that some proofs need to consider only formulas of 
restricted forms, where some or all function symbols are forbidden. 
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A.2. Corollary. Assume that T,, is complete for models qf TO for all sets qf formulas 
with no jlexible ,function symbols, that is, if no function symbol occurs in the formulas 
in 2 and {f C is T,,-consistent then 2 holds in some model qf T,,. Then T,, is complete 
for models of T,,. 
Proof. Consider a TO-consistent set of formulas E where flexible function symbols 
may occur. We eliminate all flexible function symbols as in the proposition. More 
precisely, we define 
F = {f/f is a flexible function symbol occurring in _‘}, 
2’={u’~utE}u{OVx ,... Vx,,El!y.q,(x I)...) X,,,Y)lfEF}. 
By the proposition, 2’ is T,,-consistent. The assumption yields that 2’ has models. 
In one of these models, the predicate symbols that replace the flexible function 
symbols are interpreted as functions. Hence, a model for E can be read off 
immediately. n 
A.3. Corollary. Assume that every valid formula with no function symbols is arith- 
metical in t r,, that is, ifno,function symbol occurs in u and ku then u is arithmetical 
in t,. Then every valid .formula is arithmetical in t ,?. 
Proof. Given a valid formula U, u’ is also valid. Therefore, U’ is arithmetical in kr,. 
Let cg be a clock for u’. If t, C(c,,) 1 U’ then kT2 u’. We obtain a formula c, from 
c,) by replacing all occurrences of q,(t,, . . , t,, + ,) with ,f( t,, . . , t,) = t,l+, The 
formula c, is our candidate clock for u. Assume that t, C(c,) 2 u to show that 
F r, U. By the proposition, t, [C(c,) 1 u]‘. Also, 
+,[C(c,)=u]’ - [C(c,)r>u’] 
by propositional reasoning. Therefore, t-,? C( c,,) 1 u’, and hence, since cg is a clock 
for u’, tT2 u’. By the proposition, t, u follows. n 
A.4. Corollary. Assume that to P(u) =GJ kr, u and F,, P( u) =+ t, u for every arith- 
metical formula u with no function symbols. Then kO P(u) =+ t,, u and kp P( u) + 
F~, u for every arithmetical formula u. 
Proof. Assume that t, P(U) + F~, u for all arithmetical u with no function symbols 
and that for some arithmetical U, t,, P( 0). We show that E r, ZI. Since to P(v), the 
proposition yields +. (P(u))‘. Note that k. (P(u))‘- P(u’), and hence to P(v’). 
Moreover, if v is arithmetical then so is U’ (in fact, if c is a clock for U, then c’ 
is a clock for v’). Since u’ contains no function symbols and is arithmetical, Ed, U’ 
follows from our assumption. By the proposition, t.,, u. 
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A similar argument handles t, and t,. n 
A.2. From predicates to sorts 
We show that treating a rigid predicate as a sort does not improve provability. 
This very minor proposition on sorts can be extended in a number of ways, but the 
current form suffices for our purposes. 
Suppose that Vi. u[ i] and 3i. u[ i] are used as abbreviations for Vx. (p(x) 1 u[x]) 
and 3x. (p(x) A u[x]), respectively, and that the usual rules for quantifiers are applied 
to formulas with these special sorted variables. Thus, any provability concept t is 
extended to a new provability concept E, for formulas with this kind of sort 
abbreviations. As long as p provably corresponds to a nonempty relation, F$ is no 
more powerful than the original t. 
AS. Proposition. Let p be a rigid predicate symbol and t be one of t,, and kT2. 
Suppose that u[ i, , . . . , i,,] has a proof within k-\, that is, +-,u[ i,, . . . , i,]. In this proof, 
1,,... , i, are the only variables in the sort defined by p that may occur free. Let u’ be 
the formula 
[(3x.p(x)) A P(Xl) A. . . A P(TI)l 1 u[x,, . . . , %I. 
Then lku’. 
Proof. We show how to construct a proof of FU’ by induction on the structure of 
a proof oft, u. More precisely, we check that if v is an axiom in t, then tv’, and 
that if a rule derives u from v,, . . . , vk within kY then v’ can be obtained from 
vi,..., vi within t. Again, we spell out only the arguments for the temporal axioms 
and rules; the remaining arguments are similar and totally classical. 
l If v[i,, . . . , i,] is an instance of a valid PTL schema, of u -0 u (with u rigid), 
of (Vx.0 u) = (0 Vx. u), or of [Vx. (u Q u)] = [(Vx. u) % v], then v[x,, . . . , x,] is 
an instance of the same schema, and, therefore, is an axiom. The provability of 
v’ follows immediately. 
l Suppose v is 0 w and is deduced from w. Clearly, 0 w’ can be deduced from 
M”. By propositional temporal reasoning, F(U w’) = (Cl us)‘, so (0 w)’ can be 
deduced from w’. 
l Suppose v[ i, , . . . , i,]isdeducedfromd[i ,,..., i,]Iv[i ,,..., i,],foradefinition 
d[i,, . . , i,]. Since d[x,, . . . , x,] is also a definition, v’ can be deduced from 
d[x,, . . . ,x,] 1 v’. By propositional reasoning, the formulas (d[x,, . . . , x,] 1 v’) 
and (d[i,, . . . , i,] 3 u)’ are equivalent. Therefore, U’ follows from (d 3 u)‘. n 
A.3. Some useful theorems 
In Steps 2 and 4 of the completeness theorem (Section 7) we claim that certain 
formulas are provable in T,. We justify the claim in this subsection. Most of the 
arguments are routine. Since T, is complete with respect to models of 7;, we are 
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able to give some (slightly) semantic proofs. The corresponding syntactic proofs 
are long but easy to reconstruct. 
The formulas C(c) and A are defined as in Section 7. Throughout, we consider 
a model .& of T, where C(c) and A hold. 
l t-T, (C(C)AA) 1 3x.n(x) 
The model ./M satisfies (~x.c[x]), since it satisfies C(c). Hence, it satisfies 
(3x.0 c[x]). Since n(x) is defined as 0 c[x], .M also satisfies (3x. n(x)). 
l kT,(C(c)r,A) 2 q (c[i]~u)-O(C[~]AU) (*) 
(This “duality proposition” is a useful tool in proving the remaining theorems.) 
Assume that O(c[i] A u) holds in .ZI. Suppose that q (c[i] 2 u) does not hold, that 
is, that 0( c[ i] A lu) holds. By propositional temporal reasoning we obtain 0( c[ i] A 
0 0 c[i]), in contradiction with C(c). Therefore, q (c[i] 3 u) must hold. 
Assume that q ( c[ i] 2 u) holds. By the definition of n, Oc[ i] holds; propositional 
temporal reasoning yields O(c[i] A u). 
0 +,,(C(C)AA) 3 Cl((Oc[i])~u)=0((0c[i])~u) 
The proof is similar to the previous one. 
(**) 
0 F~, (C(C)AA) 2 g,i.O,,(i) 
The model .&i satisfies 3i. c[ i], since it satisfies C(c). It follows that 3i.O,( i) holds, 
by the definition of 0,. Furthermore, if both O,,(i) and O,,(j) hold, then c[i] and 
c[,j] hold, so 0( c[ i] A c[j]) holds as well. It follows that i -,j, by the definition of =. 
0 kr, (c(c) A A) 2 vi3,,j..Y,,(i,j) 
Consider an arbitrary i. By the definition of n, c[i] must hold at some world w, 
such that M’,~ R2 M’, . Then there is some j with property c at some world w2 such 
that M’, R, w2: since C(c) must hold at us,, 03~. c[y] must hold at u’, . By the 
definition of ,s,,, this means that i has a successor. To see that this successor is unique 
(as far as = can distinguish), assume that both j and ,j’ are successors to i. Then 
both 0 c[j] and 0 c[j’] hold at M‘, ; hence c[j] A c[j’] holds at wz. It follows that 
0 O(c[j] A c[,j’]) and hence O(c[j] A c[j’]) hold at M?(,. The definition of = yields 
that j =,j’. 
a t,, (C(C)AA) 3 ViVj’j3ik.+,, (i,,j,k) 
We first show that p, defines a flexible function from numbers to numbers at all 
worlds w, such that MJ(, R2 w,. By the induction principle, it suffices to show that pi 
is a function at uzo and that if it is a function at some us, such that w,) R2 w, then it 
is a function at some w2 such that ~2, R, w2. At M’(,, p,( i,,j) holds if and only if O,,(i) 
holds; since 0, defines a constant, p, defines a function. Now assume that pi is a 
function at u’, and consider ~1~. At w?, p,( i,,j) holds if and only if for some ,j we 
have s,(j, k) and p,( i, k) holds at MJ, Since p, is a function at w, and s,, is a function, 
p, is a function at ~1~. 
To show that t, is a function, consider arbitrary i and j. By the definition of n, 
there must be some w, that satisfies c[j] such that wg R, w,. For some --unique k, 
w, satisfies p,(i, k), and hence +,(i,j, k). To finish, we need to check that if c[j] 
holds at both w, and w;, then the same k gives us p,( i, k) at w, and w{. Suppose 
that p,(i, k) holds at w,; then O(c[j] ~p,(i, k)) holds at wg. By (*), we obtain 
q (c[j]~p,(i, k)). Therefore, p,(i, k) holds at w{. If p,(i, k’) holds at w; for some 
other k’, we have k = k’ because p, defines a function. 
l kT, (C(c)r,A) 2 ViVjYik. x,, (i,j, k) 
The argument is exactly analogous to the one for +P (using f, instead of s,,). 
0 k-r, (C(c) A A) 2 Vi.(i- i) 
Consider an arbitrary i. By the definition of n, O(c[ i] A c[ i]), that is, i = i, holds. 
0 +-r, (C(C)AA) 3 ViVj.(i-jIj-i) 
Consider arbitrary i and j such that i -,j, that is, O(c[ i] A c[,j]). By commutativity, 
O( c[ j] A c[ i]), that is, j = i, holds. 
a F~-,(C(C)AA) 3 ~li~j’jtlk.((i2jAjjk)~j2k) 
Consider arbitrary i, j, and k such that i = j and j- k, that is, 0( c[i] A c[j]) and 
0( c[ j] A c[ k]). By (*), 0 (c[j] 1 c[ k]) follows. By propositional temporal reasoning, 
we obtain O(c[ i] A c[j] A c[k]), and then derive 0( c[ i] A c[ k]), that is, i = k. 
l F,,(C(C)AA) 2 vivj.(i==j~O(c[i]r\a)=O(c[j]Aa)) 
if a is atomic 
Consider arbitrary i and j such that i = j, that is, 0( c[ i] A c[j]), and assume that 
O( c[ i] A a). By (*), 0 (c[ i] 2 c[ j]) follows. By propositional temporal reasoning we 
obtain O(c[j] A a). The other direction of the equivalence is similar. 
0 i-,, (C(C)AA) 1 viyi.(i=j~a[i]-u[j]) 
if a is atomic with relation symbol n, O,, s,,, G, ==, t,, or x,, 
We prove a more general proposition instead: 
l k7,(C(c)~A) 2 vivj.(i-j~O(a[i]=u[j])) 
if a is atomic with relation symbol n, O,, s,,, G, =, p,, t,,, p2, or x,. 
We first prove the property for a atomic with relation symbol n, O,, s,,, <, or 2. 
Consider arbitrary i and j such that i = j, that is, 0( c[ i] A c[ j]). By (*), 0 (c[ i] = c[ j]) 
follows. Let d[i] and d[j] be the formulas obtained from u[i] and u[j] when the 
symbols n, O,, s,,, s, and = are replaced with their definitions. Note that u[i] and 
u[j] are provably equivalent to d[ i] and d[j], respectively. Since i and j occur 
in d[ i] and d[j] only as arguments to c, q ( c[ i] 3 c[j]) yields q (d[ i] = d[j]). 
It follows that u[i]- u[j], and then, since all symbols involved are rigid, 
q (u[i]- u[j]). 
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For p,, the proof is inductive. It suffices to show that substitutivity holds at w,, 
and that if it holds at some w, such that wg R, w1 then it holds at some w2 such 
that w, R, w2. At w,,, substitutivity holds because p, is defined in terms of =, for 
which we have already proved substitutivity. Now assume that substitutivity holds 
at w, to prove that it holds at some successor world w2. The meaning of p, at w2 
is defined in terms of sp and p, at w,; we have proved substitutivity for So and 
assumed it for p, at w,. Therefore, we have substitutivity for p1 at w2. 
Now substitutivity for f, follows because +,, is defined in terms of c and p,. A 
similar argument enables us to prove substitutivity for p2 from substitutivity for 0, 
and +,,, and substitutivity for x,, from substitutivity for p2. 
a tT, (C(c)~A)1Vi.(s(i)7~.0) 
Consider an arbitrary i and a successor of i, j. By the definition of n, we obtain 
0 0 c[j]. We have that 0 0 -ic[O] (from C(c) and the definition of O,,). Proposi- 
tional temporal reasoning yields 0( c[,j] A lc[O]); (*) yields Cl(c[,j] zlc[O]), that 
is, j # 0. 
0 kT, (C(c) A A) 1 ViVj. (s( i) = s(j) 1 i =j) 
Consider arbitrary i and j and their respective successors k and k’, and assume that 
k = k’. We obtain 0( c[ i] A 0 c[k]) and O(c[j] A 0 c[k]) by substitutivity and the 
definition of s,,. Propositional temporal reasoning yields 
O(c[i]~c[j])vOO(c[k]~OO c[k]). 
The second disjunct does not hold since C(c) holds. Hence, 0( c[i] A c[j]), that is, 
i = j, holds. 
0 tl,(C(c)~..‘i) 1 t/i.((iSO)=(i-0)) 
Consider an arbitrary i and assume that i G 0, that is, 0( c[ i] A 0 c[O]). Propositional 
temporal reasoning yields c[i] v OOc[O]. Since we have OCllc[O], we can elimi- 
nate the first disjunct and derive c[i]. The definition of 0, implies c[O], and we 
obtain O(c[i] A c[O]), that is, i-0. 
Now assume that i = 0, that is, 0( c[ i] A c[O]). Propositional temporal reasoning 
yields 0( c[ i] A 0 c[O]), that is, i G 0. 
0 t,, (C(C)AA) 1 vivj.(iSs(j)=(i-s(j)viSj)) 
Consider arbitrary i and j such that i s s(j), that is, for some k such that O(c[j] A 
0 c[ k]), 0( c[ i] A 0 c[ k]). Propositional temporal reasoning yields 
O(c[i]r,c[k])vO(c[i]nOOc[k]). 
If the first disjunct holds, we have i= k, that is, i= s(,j). If the second disjunct 
holds, we have q ((0 c[k]) = c[j]) (by (**)), and hence propositional temporal 
reasoning yields O(c[i] A 0 c[j]), that is, is j. 
Now assume that i = s(j), that is, O( c[i] A c[s(j)]). Propositional temporal reason- 
ing yields O(c[i] A 0 c[s(j)]), that is, i c s(j). Finally, assume that is j, that is, 
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O(c[ i] A 0 c[j]). Consider a successor k of j. By the definition of So, we have 
O(c[j] A 0 c[k]), and, by (*), q (c[j] 3 0 c[k]). Propositional temporal reasoning 
yields O(c[i] A 0 0 c[k]), and then 0( c[ i] A 0 c[k]), that is, i 4 k. 
l fir, (C(c) AA) 2 Vi.(i+O- i) 
Consider an arbitrary i. Suppose k= i+O, that is, O(c[O] ~p,(i, k)). By (*), q (c[O] 1 
p,(i, k)) follows, and then p,(i, k), by the definition of 0,. The definition of p, 
immediately yields i = k. 
0 ET, (c(c)~A) 1 vivj.(i+s(j)-s(i+j)) 
Consider arbitrary i and j. Suppose k = i + j, that is, 0( c[ j] A p,( i, k)). The definitions 
of s,, and p, imply 
O((O c[4j)l) A (0 p,(i, s(k)))). 
By propositional temporal reasoning we obtain 
O(c[dj)l ApI(i, s(k))), 
that is, i+s(j)-s(k). 
0 ~-_,(C(c)~A)~~i.(ixO=0) 
The argument is exactly analogous to the one for i + 0 = i. 
l tTl(C(c)~A)~~i~j.(iXs(j)=iXj+i) 
Consider arbitrary i and j. Suppose k 2- i xj, that is, 0( c[ j] A pz( i, k)). The definitions 
of s,, and pz imply 
O((0 c[4j)l) A (0 p2(i, k-t i))). 
By propositional temporal reasoning we obtain 
O(d.01 Adi, k-t i)), 
that is, i x s(j) 2 k + i. 
l +,(c(c)~A) 2 [u[O]~(Vi.u[i]~u[s(i)])=(Vi.u[i])] 
if u is c-formed 
Given a c-formed formula u[x], assume u[O] and (Vi. u[i] 2 u[s(i)]). Define the 
rigid predicate symbol p to be u at the initial world, that is, Vx. (p(x) = u[x]), and 
expand A with a relation for the defined rigid symbol p. Now we prove that 
0 Vi. (c[ i] 3 p(i)). By the induction principle, it suffices to show that Vi. (c[ i] 1 p(i)) 
holds at w0 and that if it holds at some W, such that w0 R2 w, then it holds at some 
w2 such that w, R, w2. 
Since u[O] holds at wO, u[i] holds at w0 for any i such that i -0 (by substitutivity). 
If c[i] holds at wO, then i=O (by the definition of -) and hence u[i] holds at w(,. 
The definition of p immediately yields p(i). 
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Now assume that Vi. (c[i] xp( i)) holds at W, to show that it holds at some 
successor world w2. Consider an arbitrary i such that c[ i] holds at w, , and hence 
p(i) holds at w,. Since p is rigid, p(i) holds at w(, as well. The definition of p 
guarantees that u[i] holds at wg, and hence that u[s(i)] holds at w(,. Consider an 
arbitrary j such that c[,j] holds at w2, and hence j = s(i) holds at wo. Substitutivity 
yields u[j]. From the definition of p we obtain that p(j) holds at wO, and hence at 
w2 as well. 
The definition of n implies that Vi.0 c[i]. We obtain Vi.0 p(i). Since p is a rigid 
symbol, this entails Vi.p(i), that is, Vi. u[ i]. 
a Ed, (C(C)AA) 1 p(t ,,..., tL)-O(c[m]r\p(t ,,..., tk)) ifp is rigid 
Assume that p(r,, . , tk) holds. Since p is rigid, 0 p(t,, . . , tk) holds as well. For 
any m, 0 c[m] holds (by the definition of n). Propositional temporal reasoning 
yields O(c[m]np(t ,,..., jr)). 
AssumethatO(c[m]r\p(t,,..., tk)) holds. Then p( t,, . . . , fk) holds at some world 
w, such that u’,) Rz w,. Since p is rigid, p(t,, . . , tk) must also hold at wO. 
0 i-,, (C(c)nA) 1 -~O(c[m]r\ u)=O(c[m]r\lu) 
Propositional temporal reasoning yields this syntactic variant of (*). 
l kr,(C(c)r\A) 2 (O(C[m]AU,)AO(C[m]AU~))-o(C[m]A(U,AU,)) 
Assume that both O(c[m] A u,) and O(c[m] A u7) hold. Then q (c[m] 3 u,) holds 
(by (*)); o( c[m] A (u, A ~4’)) follows by propositional temporal reasoning. 
Assume that O( c[ m] A (u, A u2)) holds. Then both 0( c[m] A u,) and 0( c[m] A U2) 
follow trivially, and so does their conjunction. 
0 t,(C(C)AA) 1 ~x’.O(c[m]~u[x’])~O(c[m]~Vx.u[x]) 
(x’ does not occur in c[ m]) 
Assume that Vx’.O(c[m] A u[x’]) holds. By (*), Vx’.O(c[m] 2 u[x’]) holds. This 
formula is equivalent to 0 Vx’. (c[ m] 1 u[x’]). Since the variable x’ does not occur 
in c[m], we can derive q (c[m]~Vx.u[x]). By (*), O(c[m]~Vx.u[x]) holds. 
Assume that O(c[m] A Vx. u[x]) holds. By (*), q (c[m] 2 Vx. u[x]) holds. For a 
new variable x’, we obtain 0 Vx’.(c[m] 13 u[x’]). This formula is equivalent to 
Vx’.O(c[m] 2 u[x’]). By (*), Vx’.O(c[m] A u[x’]) holds. 
0 ~,,(C(C)AA) 1 O(c[s(m)]r\u)-O(c[m]~Ou) 
Assume that O(c[s(m)]~ u) holds. By (*), q (c[s(m)]~u) holds. Together 
with the definition of s,,, this yields o( c[ m] A o( c[s(m)] A U)), and hence also 
O(c[m]AO u). 
Assume that O(c[m] A 0 u) holds. Together with the definition of s,,, this yields 
O((0 c[s(m)]j A (0 u)). The conclusion O(c[s(m)] A u) follows by propositional 
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temporal reasoning. 
0 tr, (C(c) A A) 5) 
Vi~m.[O(c[i]AU)v3j.(m~j~iiO(c[j]~u))] 
= O(C[??l] A U 011 V) 1. 
Assume that 
Viam.[O(c[i]~u)v3j.(m~j~i~O(c[j]~v))] 
holds. Suppose that lO(c[m] A U % v) holds, to derive a contradiction. By (*), we 
obtain 0( c[ m] A l( u % v)), and then 0( c[ m] A (( lu) P v)). Since C(c) holds, for 
some k we have 
O[c[m]~((c[k]Am)~v)]. (T) 
It follows that O(c[k] A lu) and k 3 m. Hence, our assumption yields 
O(c[k]r,u)v3j.(m~j~k~O(c[j]~v)). 
Since we have O(c[k] A lu), (*) enables us to eliminate the first disjunct. Thus, for 
some j such that m 4 j s k, O(c[j] A u) holds, and then (i) yields 
O[c[m]~((c[k]~~u)9’u)~O(c[j]~v)]. 
By propositional temporal reasoning, we obtain 
[(c[j]~ur\O(c[k]r,iu)) ~u]vO(c[k]~OO c[j]). 
The first disjunct leads to u 9’ V, an unsatisfiable formula. The second disjunct is 
ruled out by Jo k together with C(c). In both cases we have contradictions. 
Now assume that O(c[m] A U “u u) holds. Suppose that 
iVi~m.[O(c[i]r\~)v3j.(m~j~ir,O(c[j]Av))] 
holds, to derive a contradiction. Then for some i 2 m we have q (c[i] 3 lu), and 
hence O(c[i] A lu) (by (*)), and for all j between m and i we have q (c[j] 2 IV). 
We derive 
O[c[m] A U 011 u A O(c[i]) A ((Oc[i]) %I c[i])] 
from ia m and C(c), and then 
O[c[m]Au%vAO(c[i])A((3j.c[j]AOO~c[m]AOc[i]) %c[i])] 
from C(c). The definition of s enables us to conclude 
O[U%!v~O(c[i])~((~j.m~jSi~c[j]) “uc[i])]. 
SinceO(c[i]~lu) and msjsi~Cl(c[j]~lv) (andCl(c[i]Ilv) in particular), 
propositional temporal reasoning yields 
O[U % VA o(lU) A ((3j.lU) %r (1U A lV))]. 
This is equivalent to 
o[U %! U A @(lU) A (1U % (1U A lV))], 
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an unsatisfiable formula. 
0 kr, (C(c)r\A) 1 (u-O(c[O]r\u)) for all u 
Assume that u holds. Since c[O] holds, c[O] A u holds, and so does O(c[O] A u). 
Assume that O(c[O] A u) holds. By (*), Cl(c[O]= U) holds as well. Since c[O] 
holds, u follows. 
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